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ABSTRACT
On April 15, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. on the question, “Are human genes patentable?”
This article argues that human genes are not patentable and that
isolating a gene from its surroundings in a human body—or
creating synthetically what exists in nature as DNA—does not
cause the DNA to become patentable subject matter. The isolated
DNA segments of claim 1 have the identical nucleotide sequence
and the same function as native DNA, and the isolated DNA of
claim 1 do not reflect the marked changes required under
Chakrabarty, or the inventive step required under Prometheus, to
change an unpatentable product of nature into patentable subject
matter. Claim 2 describes those nucleotides in the DNA sequence
that code for the polypeptide identified in the Myriad Genetics
patent specification and simply reflects the genetic code, an
unpatentable law of nature. Since no inventive step has been added
to the law of nature, claim 2 constitutes unpatentable subject
matter under Prometheus. The Federal Circuit’s contrary decision
in Myriad Genetics disregards 150 years of Supreme Court cases
that physical phenomena found in nature and laws of nature are
not patentable subject matter and threatens to enclose building
blocks of nature under federal patent law. The Supreme Court
should reverse the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad Genetics
on claims 1 and 2.

†

Adjunct professor of law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and
a 1971 graduate of Yale Law School. In 2008, Professor Rogers retired as a partner
in the Intellectual Property Group of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP. He
gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professor Joshua Sarnoff to an earlier
draft of this article without suggesting that Professor Sarnoff agrees with the
statements made in this article.

435

AFTER PROMETHEUS

[Vol. 11

INTRODUCTION
“The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of societyat odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be
freely given.”
– Justice Clark for a unanimous Supreme Court1
“Most industries could get along fine without patent protection.”
– Judge Richard A. Posner2
“Life’s instructions ought not be controlled by legal monopolies at the
whim of Congress or the courts.”
– James D. Watson3
“Diagnostic genetic testing for the existence of BRCA mutations is
. . . an important consideration in the provision of clinical care for breast or
ovarian cancer.”4 Myriad Genetics uses its patents in cancer-screening
genetic tests and has sued companies using competing genetic tests for
patent infringement.5 Meanwhile, patients claim that they have been unable
to obtain needed genetic testing as the result of Myriad Genetics’ patent
enforcement.6 The Association for Molecular Pathology filed suit and
obtained a U.S. District Court declaration that Myriad Genetics’ patents on
isolated DNA segment were invalid. When the Federal Circuit reversed the
District Court decision, the Association petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court
to hear the case.7
On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. on the

1

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.1, 9 (1966).
Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC,
July 12, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-aretoo-many-patents-in-america/259725.
3
Brief of James D. Watson, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
1, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12-398 (U.S. Jan.
31, 2013), 2013 WL 432951, at *1. James Watson is, of course, the co-discoverer
of the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (and winner of the Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1962).
4
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
5
Id. at 1314–16.
6
Id. at 1315.
7
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., No. 12-398 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012), 2012 WL 4502947.
2
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question, “Are human genes patentable?”8 The composition claims of the
patents at issue “cover two ‘isolated’ human genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2
. . . and certain alterations, or mutations, in these genes associated with a
predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers.”9 In spite of an earlier remand
from the Supreme Court for the Federal Circuit to reconsider its 2011
decision in Myriad Genetics in light of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,10 the
Federal Circuit held—in a conflicted opinion with two separate
concurrences—that the BRCA gene claims constituted patentable subject
matter.11
Each of the Federal Circuit’s Myriad Genetics opinions either
disregarded or misapplied the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. that certain
medical diagnostic claims constituted unpatentable laws of nature.12 The
Prometheus Court declared that over 150 years of Supreme Court
8

Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed.
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (Nov. 30, 2012), 2012 WL 4508118. The
Federal Circuit decided the case for the second time on August 16, 2012, with three
separate opinions, including one in dissent, reported as Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d
1303. The US Patent and Trademark Office was dismissed from the suit earlier, and
that dismissal was not appealed. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Myriad
Genetics, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 4502947, at *ii.
9
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1304.
10
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
11
689 F.3d at 1333. The District Court's decision finding the product claims to
constitute unpatentable subject matter is Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Federal
Circuit’s initial decision reversing the District Court’s decision is reported at 653
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). There were both process and product claims at issue,
and for a detailed discussion of the 2011 Federal Circuit decision in Myriad
Genetics on claim 1 of the product patents, see Douglas L. Rogers, Coding For
Life—Should Any Entity Have The Exclusive Right To Use And Sell Isolated DNA?,
12 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (Fall 2011). At 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded the 2011 decision in Myriad
Genetics for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in
Prometheus.
12
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. In Prometheus, the District Court for the
Southern District of California had granted summary judgment invalidating the
patents. 2008 WL 878910, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008). The Federal Circuit reversed. 581
F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
vacated—at 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)—the Federal Circuit’s decision for
reconsideration in light of its earlier decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010). On reconsideration the Federal Circuit again reversed the decision of the
District Court. 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Then the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit on the merits. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
(2012).

437

AFTER PROMETHEUS

[Vol. 11

precedents “insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law
also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes
referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law
itself.”13 The Supreme Court further cautioned that patents tying up uses of
the laws of nature could inhibit future innovation.14
This article argues that the Supreme Court should reverse the
Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad Genetics and continue to protect what
has existed as part of the public domain throughout our history—physical
phenomena and laws of nature. Under Prometheus and other Supreme Court
precedents, patent claims that focus on a natural law must contain an
inventive concept and must not merely apply known practices or
limitations. Myriad Genetics’ Claim 1 simply describes a physical
phenomenon and a law of nature—specified sequences of DNA that result
in the creation of specific amino acids—without any inventive concept.
Myriad Genetics’ Claim 2 is a subset of Claim 1 and simply describes the
DNA nucleotides that create the amino acids pursuant to a law of nature—
again without any inventive concept.
Part I of this article analyzes the Supreme Court precedents that
limit exclusive patent rights preventing other market participants from
freely using laws of nature and physical phenomena to compete.
Specifically, part I argues that Prometheus clarifies the boundaries for
patent eligible subject matter in the genetic age so building blocks of nature
remain free for all to use.15
13

Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1301 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, & R. Wolk
Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L.REV. 1315 (2011); CHRISTINA BOHANNAN &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY
AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 112 (Oxford University Press 2011) [hereinafter
CREATION]; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Harvard University Press 2003)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]).
15
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“The
qualities of those bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . manifestations of
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”); Joshua D.
Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History And Theory, 63 HASTINGS
L.J. 53, 57–58 (2011) (“The patent system is not supposed to reward discoveries of
basic science and at least some other kinds of human discoveries, no matter how
much money, effort, creativity and disclosure went into developing and
disseminating that highly useful knowledge.”); Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter
Eligibility—A Disease And A Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 428 (2011) (“The Court
should redefine its vague and relatively weak judicial prohibition against the
patenting of nature and abstract ideas in terms of a stronger, more explicit
14
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Part II of this article shows that the words “invention,” “new,” and
“useful” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 are consistent with the Supreme Court’s
exclusion of physical phenomena and laws of nature from patent
enclosure.16 Part II also shows that the term “new” in § 101 and in earlier
statutes has retained for over 200 years a different meaning than “novelty”
and “prior art” in §§ 102 and 103. The exclusions of physical phenomena
and laws of nature are therefore not the results of a judicially active court
limiting the will of Congress.
Part III.A of this article analyzes the three conflicting opinions in
the Federal Circuit’s 2012 Myriad Genetics decision. Part III.B argues that
the conclusion of Judges Lourie and Moore—that the isolated DNA
segments of Claim 1 constitute patentable subject matter—disregards the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Prometheus, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,17 and
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.18 Part III.C argues that even
if the isolated cDNA segments of Claim 2 do not fit within the guidance of
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, the isolated cDNA segments under
Prometheus cover an unpatentable law of nature—the genetic code.
This article concludes that the Federal Circuit’s disregard in Myriad
Genetics of the laws of nature and the requirement of an inventive concept
where the patent claims focus on laws of nature allows enclosure of the
building blocks of nature that should instead remain part of the public
domain.

I. PATENT LAW AND EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABLE SUBJECT
MATTER
A. Foundations of Patent Law
Patents are restrictions on competition imposed by the federal
government.19 The constitutional basis for patents is Article I, § 8, clause 8
prohibition against the patenting of ‘basic tools of scientific and technological
work.’” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
16
See, e.g., Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework For Patent Eligibility, 85
TUL. L. REV. 323, 339 (2010) (“[N]atural principles may not receive patent
protection because, under the terms of the patent statute, they can never be deemed
new.”). For a discussion of the enclosure of what had been held in common in
England, see JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF
THE MIND 43–53 (Yale University Press 2008) (“Enclosure did not necessarily
mean physical fencing, though that could happen. More likely, the previously
common land was converted into private property, generally controlled by a single
landholder.”).
17
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2207–12 (1980).
18
333 U.S. at 130.
19
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) provides, “Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the
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of the U.S. Constitution (the “Patent Clause”). It grants Congress the power
“[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries . . . .”20 The statutory basis for patents is 35 U.S.C. § 101,
which provides, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”21 The Supreme Court refers to
these categories (process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, and
improvement thereof) as patentable subject matter.22
Even though the Supreme Court has said Congress intended courts
to give patent statutes “wide scope,”23 for over 150 years the Court has
patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .” Professor Lessig observed,
“A patent is a form of governmental regulation. It is a state-backed monopoly
granting exclusive rights to an ‘inventor’ for an invention deemed useful, novel,
and nonobvious.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 205 (Random House 2001). In Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945), the Supreme Court said that “a patent is an exception to the general rule
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market.”
20
The complete text of clause 8 is, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries” (capitalization as in original). Although
not apparent from first reading, “useful arts”, “inventors” and “discoveries” are the
words grating the authority for patents, and “science”, “authors” and “writings” are
the words granting the authority for copyrights. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID,
TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION, 1793–836, at 19 (1998) (“[T]he intellectual property clause
clearly encompassed two separate powers packaged together; one to promote the
progress of science, i.e., knowledge, through the exclusive grant known as a
copyright, and the other to promote the progress of useful arts through the exclusive
grant known as a patent.”). See also DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS
OV-2, OV-3, 1-6, 1-7; R. CARL MOY, 1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1.11 (4th
ed.).
21
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (emphasis added). For examples of 35 U.S.C.'s
conditions and requirements, see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty), 103 (nonobvious
subject matter) and 112 (specification).
22
Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). Regardless of whether
or not the claimed invention meets the other criteria for a patent, an individual
cannot obtain a patent unless the invention “falls within one of the express
categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101”. Id.; see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
23
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). The Court in Chakrabarty
noted that committee reports on the 1952 Patent Act informed the Court, “Congress
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by
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consistently identified boundaries to patentable subject matter: “laws of
nature”, “physical” or “natural phenomena”24 and “abstract ideas” are not
patentable.25 Addressing these boundaries, Professor Eileen Kane has
explained that “[t]he underlying rationale for the exclusions is that scientific
advances depend on an available substrate of basic knowledge, and that,
therefore, patenting the intellectual foundations of a field has an adverse
effect on its progress.”26 As a result of these exclusions, what might
otherwise fit within the statutory definitions of “process,” “composition of
matter,” “manufacture,” or “machine” is not patentable if the proposed
patent effectively claims a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an
abstract idea.27
man.’” 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952)). However,
the Supreme Court clearly limited that general statement by the exclusions the
Court repeated in Chakrabarty, that the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas are not patentable. Id. For additional views that the quote from the
committee report was more limited, see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3248–49 (2010)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A
Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 261,
279–281 (2005); 1 WALKER, supra note 20, § 5:1, at 5–8 (“[W]hile both Congress
and the courts have stated that the statutory language of section 101 encompasses
‘anything under the sun that is made by man,’ . . . this is decidedly not the case.
Instead, the authorities have agreed that certain types of activity are non-statutory
subject matter, even where the particular subject matter at hand could be described
nominally in the terms of section 101 as, for example, a process or an article of
manufacture.”).
24
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (referring to the three exceptions to patentable
subject matter under § 101 as “laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract
ideas.”) In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), the Court referred to
“natural phenomena” as unpatentable; in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972), the Court referred to “Phenomena of nature” as unpatentable; and in Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978), the Court referred to “Phenomena of nature” as
unpatentable. The Court has used those terms—physical phenomena and natural
phenomena—interchangeably. This article generally uses “physical phenomena”
instead of “natural phenomena,” to try to better distinguish between physical matter
found in nature (physical phenomena) and relationships inherent in nature (laws of
nature), although frequently the lines are not clear.
25
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker, 437 U.S. at 584; Gottschalk, 409
U.S. at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948);
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
26
Eileen M. Kane, Patenting Genes and Genetic Methods: What's At Stake?, 6 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 4–5 (2011).
27
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (“Any suggestion in this Court’s case law that the
Patent Act’s terms deviate from their ordinary meaning has only been an
explanation for the exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”). In Bilski, the Supreme Court limited the meaning of “process” to avoid the
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Of course, nothing made by humans can flout laws of nature, and
all physical objects must be derived in part from products found in nature.28
However, humans did not invent laws of nature or physical phenomena, so
these are not “new.”29 Courts must draw lines for determining the difference
between (1) unpatentable laws of nature or physical phenomena and (2)
patentable applications of those unpatentable elements.30
In its 2012 decision in Myriad Genetics, the Federal Circuit said,
without reference to any research or Supreme Court precedents supporting
its view, that “patents on life-saving material and processes, involving large
amounts of risky investment, would seem to be precisely the types of
subject matter that should be subject to the incentives of exclusive rights.”31
Yet scientists provided empirical evidence to the U.S. Government in 2010
that patents on basic genetic discoveries had not increased basic genetic
research and had probably harmed the availability of genetic testing.32 Legal
scholars have likewise argued that the aggressive patenting of basic research
encouraged by federal legislation and case law did not in fact further the
issuance of a patent for an abstract idea. Id. at 3229–31. This article focuses on
laws of nature and physical phenomena rather than abstract ideas, since those are
the exclusions applicable to patents for isolated DNA segments.
28
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012) (“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”); ROBIN FELDMAN,
RETHINKING PATENT LAW 96 (2012) (“All inventions to some extent rely on and
use laws of nature, laws of physics, and other natural phenomena.”); Parasidis,
supra note 16, at 327.
29
See infra Part II.C. The basis for and the application of the abstract ideas
exclusion to many cases and different fact situations is beyond the scope of this
article, although this article discusses some Supreme Court cases on abstract ideas,
because they shed light on the importance the Supreme Court has placed on the
exclusions from patentable subject matter.
30
See, e.g., Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (“[A]n application of a law of nature
or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
187 (1981))).
31
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
32
Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society,
Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to
Genetic Tests, OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES (April 2010), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf. The
Roster and Ex Officio Members of SACGHS are listed at pp. i–iv. Specifically, the
Chair of the SACGHS Report concluded, “The substantial number of existing
patents on genes and methods of diagnosis also pose a threat to the development of
multiplex testing, parallel sequencing, and whole-genomic sequencing, the areas of
genetic testing with the greatest potential future benefits.” Id. at cover letter.
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economic goal of developing new products.33 Furthermore, some
economists have argued that intellectual property laws, including patent
law, “does not increase either innovation or creation. They are an
unnecessary evil.”34 At a minimum, there is controversy over the effect of
patents on innovation in basic research.35
The statute on subject matter patentability, however, has remained
strikingly similar since 1790. Since 1793, the statute has required that in
order to be patentable, the claimant must have “invented a new and useful
. . . machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”36 As a result,
33

Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights And
The Norms Of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 115 (1999). Professor Rai was
referring particularly to the Bayh-Dole Act codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212,
Chakrabarty, and Diehr.
34
MICHELLE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7
(2010). Boldrin and Levine do not argue for the immediate elimination of
intellectual property laws, acknowledging that “a sudden elimination of intellectual
property laws may bring about collateral damages of an intolerable magnitude . . .
[A]bolition must be approached by smaller steps . . . .” Id. at 244–45. With respect
to pharmaceutical innovation, they argue that, “[f]ar from encouraging great new
health and life-saving products, the [patent] system instead produces too much
innovation and expense of the wrong kind—me-too drugs to get around the other
guy’s patents and get a share of a lucrative market . . . .” Id. at 238. On the other
hand, there is much scholarly support for the proposition that patents increase
innovation. See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 20, at § 1:39, 1–82 (“The favored
explanation for the patent system in the United States is that it creates an incentive
for persons to engage in inventive activity.”); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
35
See, e.g., STEPHEN A. HANSEN ET AL., AMERICAN ASSOC. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE
UNITED STATES SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 7 (2007), available at
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPI_US_IP_Survey.pdf; ROBERT P. MERGES,
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011) (“I simply cannot justify our current
IP [both copyright and patent] system on the basis of verifiable data showing that
people are better off with IP law than they would be without it.”); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1098 (2008)
(reviewing various empirical studies and concluding that “[s]urvey results from
scientists suggest that, although commercial scientists face more obstacles from
intellectual property than academic scientists, in both settings it is rare for an
ongoing project to be stopped because of patents . . . . On the other hand, scientists
in both academic and commercial laboratories report more problems in gaining
access to ‘practically excludable’ resources such as tangible materials and data that
they cannot readily duplicate in their own laboratories.”).
36
Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1790 provided for the grant of a patent to “any
person or persons . . . [who] hath or have invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before
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Supreme Court cases from the 1800s and 1900s interpreting the predecessor
to current § 101 remain important today, especially in light of the common
law tradition of interpreting patentable subject matter.37

B. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Chakrabarty
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court examined what must
be free from patents for all to use. In LeRoy v. Tatham, the Court held, “[a]
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive;

known or used . . . if they [any two of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the
Department of War and Attorney General] shall deem the invention or discovery
sufficiently useful and important . . . .” 9 CHISUM, supra note 20, at App. 9-1.
Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793 provided for the grant of a patent to any
person(s) who “have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine
manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the
application . . . .” The 1793 Patent Act, however, eliminated the requirement that
the invention be deemed “sufficiently useful and important.” Id., App. 10-1; 1
CHISUM, supra note 20, at OV-3. Section 6 of the Patent Act of 1836 provided for a
patent to “any person or persons having discovered or invented any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not
known or used by others before his or their discovery of invention thereof . . . .” 9
CHISUM, supra note 20, at App. 11-3. Section 24 of the Patent Act of 1870 had
essentially identical language on the basic requirements, although there were other
modifications to the requirements. The requirement of “invent”, “new” and “useful”
was continued in the Patent Act of 1952, although that Act substituted “process” for
“art.” Id. at App. 19-7. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) defines “process” to mean “process, art
or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material.”
37
Cf. Peter S. Menell, Forty Years Of Wandering In The Wilderness And No Closer
To The Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism And The Missed
Opportunity To Return Patent Law To Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1289, 1314 (2011) (“[P]atentable subject matter cannot evolve to meet the new
challenges of the new information age without integrating eighteenth-, nineteenth-,
and twentieth-century sources of patentable subject matter into a flexible and
evolving body of common law that is sensitive to history, statutory evolution,
constitutional constraints, and understanding of modern science and technology.
This will be particularly important as courts confront the patentability of DNA
compounds, diagnostic tests and unforeseeable information age innovations.”);
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms And The Common Law Of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV.
51, 53, 108 (2010) (“[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a common
law enabling statute . . . . For more than two hundred years the courts have
navigated the contours of the patent system, adeptly construing doctrine and
interpreting elliptical statutory phrases . . . This accretive process . . . possesses
comparative advantages to congressional enactments.”).
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these cannot be patented . . . .”38 In O'Reilly v. Morse, the Court explained
its rejection of Morse’s claim to electro-magnetism with the following
analogy: “No one, we suppose, will maintain that Fulton could have taken
out a patent for his invention of propelling vessels by steam, describing the
process and machinery he used, and claimed under it the exclusive right to
use the motive power of the steam.”39 In American Wood Paper Co. v.
Fibre Disintegrating Co., the Supreme Court rejected a patent for cellulose
“isolated” from nature and held that “the manufacture claimed as novel is
not a new composition of matter, but an extract obtained by the
decomposition or disintegration of material substances.”40 Finally, in
Cochrane v. Badische Anlin & Soda Farik, the Supreme Court rejected a
patent for a synthetically made dye, alizarine, that had previously been
made by isolating dye from the root of the madder plant, characterizing the
claimed invention as “an old article” and noting that “[c]alling it artificial
alizarine did not make it a new composition of matter, and patentable.”41
What do these nineteenth century cases suggest? The Court has
long recognized that patents could not issue for fundamental principles or
truths42 or products that existed in nature.43 Further, simply claiming what
nature does is not patentable.44 While the Court established no clear formula
38

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). Tatham involved a patent for
machinery for making pipes and tubes from metallic substances. Id. at 156.
39
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–13 (1853). The Court upheld Samuel
Morse’s invention of the telegraph, but rejected as “too broad” his eighth claim
for the “use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call
electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances . . . .” Id.
40
Am. Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 593, 596 (1874).
The case specifically involved “a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, made
from wood or other vegetable substances, by boiling the wood or other vegetable
substance in . . . alkali.” Id. at 577. It is apparent that the structure of the wood pulp
claimed was different than the structure of cellulose found in nature. There
separately was a process claim at issue. Id. at 593, 596–97. The Court said, “It is
insisted . . . that the paper-pulp which had been produced before . . . was not pure
cellulose, . . . and from this it is argued that the pure article obtained from wood by
[the inventor’s] . . . process is a different and new product, or manufacture.” Id. at
594. Whether or not the wood pulp produced by the patentee in fact was pure
cellulose, the Court proceeded on the assumption it was. Id. at 596.
41
Cochrane v. Badische, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884). FELDMAN, supra note 28, at
328 n.193, refers to this view of the case as “effectively dictum.” This is incorrect,
however, because the Court did not choose between the two views of the case
expressed in the opinion, but concluded, “In either view the decree of the circuit
court must be reversed . . . .” Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 313.
42
Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175.
43
Am. Wood Paper, 90 U.S. at 593, 596.
44
The eighth claim in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–13 (1853).
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for determining patent eligibility, the mere fact that humans synthetically
made a product45 or isolated it from nature46 did not guarantee that the
product constituted patentable subject matter. Instead, there must be
different characteristics and uses in the claimed product than existed with
the natural product.47
The Supreme Court cases in the twentieth century continued to
recognize these limits on patentable subject matter when the patent claims
focused on laws of nature or products found in nature. For instance, the
Supreme Court rejected in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co. a
patent for “[f]resh citrus fruit of which the rind or skin carries borax in
amount . . . sufficient to render the fruit resistant to blue mold decay.”48 The
Supreme Court explained, “There is no change in the name, appearance, or
general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same
beneficial uses as theretofore.”49
In 1948, the Supreme Court invalidated in Funk Brothers Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co. a patent for a combination of bacteria for leguminous
plants mixed in a powder or liquid base and packaged for sale.50 Different
bacteria promoted growth in different legumes, but when mixed together,
the experience had been that the different bacteria inhibited the positive
growth effects of each other on the legumes.51 The inventor had discovered
that certain bacteria could be mixed together without the inhibiting effect,
and so he sold to the public packages containing a mixture of certain
bacteria (presumably a mixture not found in nature) for use with different
species of legumes.52 The Court held that the inventor “does not create state
of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria . . . [and] patents cannot

45

Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 311.
Am. Wood Paper, 90 U.S. at 593, 596.
47
Id.
48
Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931).
49
Id. at 11–12. See Kane, supra note 26, at 13 (“[T]he Supreme Court decided that
the addition of borax to the rind of an orange to increase its longevity did not confer
a patentable distinction, when compared to an unadulterated orange, to create an
article of manufacture . . . .”).
50
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129, 132 (1948). The
issue in Funk Bros. was not “whether the methods of selecting and testing the noninhibitive strains are patentable.” Id. at 130 (emphasis added). The case concerned
only product claims. What the Court described as illustrative was the following
claim: “An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected
mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus
Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to
fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are specific.” Id. at 127 n.1.
51
Id. at 129.
52
Id.
46
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issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature.”53 The Court added that
“[t]he qualities of those bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . .
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”54 The mixing of the bacteria in a powder or liquid base thus did not
render the bacteria patentable.
In 1966, in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,55 a case
involving a patent for an improvement in a clamp for plows, the Supreme
Court again emphasized, “Congress may not authorize the issuance of
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”56 It
cautioned that “[t]his is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it
may not be ignored.”57
In the fifteen years after Graham, the Court restated in a number of
cases the same principle—patents cannot remove from the public domain
information and material already available to the public. For instance, in
1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson,58 the Supreme Court said that “[p]henomena
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work.”59 In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Parker v. Flook60
53

Id. at 130.
Id. For a discussion of conflicting interpretations of Funk Brothers, see John M.
Conley & Robert Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature
Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 301, 330–34 (2003). Professor Conley and Dr. Makowski conclude that
“[a] fairer characterization of the holding is that Bond failed because his real and
only discovery was the product of nature, which he applied in only the most
obvious way possible: exactly as he found it. In other words, his patent was denied
because his purported ‘application’ was not materially distinguishable from the
work of nature.” Id. at 334.
55
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
56
Id. at 6. The Court was not considering the three exemptions from patentable
subject matter in Graham, but this statement of a “non-removal” principle is a
compelling rationale for the exclusions of laws of nature and physical phenomena
from patentable subject matter.
57
Id. Allen Yu argues that “subject matter eligibility is more than just a substantive
patentability requirement, it is fundamentally a constitutional requirement touching
upon the very existential reasons for having a patent system.” Yu, supra note 15, at
425.
58
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
59
Id. at 67. As set forth above in notes 29–30 and accompanying text, it is easy to
understand that physical phenomena and natural laws are not new, although humans
may only recently have discovered them. It may be more difficult to categorize
certain abstract ideas as previously available to the public. As mentioned in note 27,
supra, a detailed analysis of the relationship between the abstract ideas exclusion
54
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that a patent using an algorithm to adjust alarm limits during catalytic
conversion—without the addition of an inventive concept—was invalid.61
As the Court explained, “Even though a phenomenon of nature or
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the
principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon
cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its
application.”62
American Fruit Growers, Funk Brothers, Graham, Gottschalk, and
Flook exclude from patentable subject matter products and fundamental
principles that exist in nature, whether or not humans had discovered them
before the claimed invention. Further, mere practical applications of such
principles cannot transform unpatentable truths into patentable subject
matter. American Fruit Growers and Funk Brothers also support the
principle that, in determining whether a composition constitutes patentable
subject matter, a court must consider not only whether the specific
composition is found in nature, but also whether the human intervention
significantly changed the functioning of the composition.

C. Chakrabarty, Diehr, and Bilski
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court first addressed whether living
matter (specifically, living matter created by inserting at least two plasmids
into the cell of a bacteria to significantly change the functioning of the
bacteria) constituted patentable subject matter under § 101.63 The sole
and § 101 is beyond the scope of this article, since the composition claims of
Myriad Genetics do not raise the issue of abstract ideas.
60
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
61
Id. at 590–94.
62
Id. at 594 (emphasis added). Earlier in the opinion, the Court said, “[w]hether the
algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as
one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ . . . it is treated as
though it were a familiar part of the prior art.” Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at
67). This phrase, “treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” has
provoked controversy—apart from the holding in the case.
63
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (“We granted certiorari to
determine whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter
. . . .”). Of course, the humans did not create the life in the bacteria or the plasmids,
but inserted living plasmids into living bacteria. The Supreme Court explained,
“Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromosomes of the
cell. In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids
control the oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria. In particular, the two
researchers discovered plasmids capable of degrading camphor and octane, two
components of crude oil. In the work represented by the patent application at issue
here, Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable
of degrading four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained
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issue in Chakrabarty was whether the enhanced bacteria constituted
patentable subject matter under § 101.64 To resolve the issue, the Court
noted that it must determine whether the micro-organism constitutes a
manufacture or composition of matter.65 Though the Court first adopted
broad definitions of “manufacture”66 and “composition of matter,”67 it also
recognized that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are
excluded from patentable subject matter.68
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that “the patentee has
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His
discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is
patentable subject matter under § 101.”69 The Court explained that the
plasmid-enhanced bacteria were capable of degrading multiple components
of crude oil, a use possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria, and
therefore had significant value for the treatment of oil spills.70
As in American Wood Paper, American Fruit Growers, and Funk
Bros., the Court in Chakrabarty compared (1) the physical characteristics
of the invention to what had been found in nature (the plasmid-enhanced
bacteria compared to natural bacterium) and (2) the functioning of the
invention to what had been found in nature (the plasmid-enhanced bacteria
did degrade crude oil, whereas natural bacteria did not).71 The Court said
stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium, which itself has no capacity for
degrading oil.” Id. at 305 n.1.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 307. Finding patentable subject matter, the Court did not state whether the
bacteria was a manufacture or a composition of matter. Id. at 307–09.
66
Id. at 308 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11).
67
Id. (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C.1957)).
68
Id. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
69
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added). The Court did not discuss a
standard for determining “markedly different.“
70
Id. at 304. Professor Rai observed that Chakrabarty “heralded a more favorable
attitude towards patents” and that subsequently the Federal Circuit significantly
strengthened patent rights. See Rai, supra note 33, at 101.
71
For a detailed discussion of Chakrabarty, see John M. Conley & Roberte
Makowski, Back To The Future: Rethinking The Product Of Nature Doctrine As A
Barrier To Biotechnology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
301, 371–76 (April 2003). Professor Conley and Dr. Makowski state that it is clear
in Chakrabarty that the Court considered Funk Brothers good law. Id. at 376. They
also wrote that the “principal distinction” between Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty
“appears to be that the Funk inventor did his work by mixing cells, whereas
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that the relevant distinction “was not between living and inanimate things,
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions.”72 The Court did not address the standard for determining
patentable subject matter, which tests (a) if humans had subtracted elements
from a product found in nature, or (b) if humans had created a synthetic
copy of what existed in nature.73
Just a year later, in Diamond v. Diehr,74 the Supreme Court upheld
a patent that was drawn to applications of an unpatentable formula in an
industrial setting.75 The Court declared, “While a scientific truth, or the
mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may
be,”76 when it transforms an article to a different state or thing.77 The Court
held the patent constituted patentable subject matter because it did not view
the claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula but rather to
cover an industrial process in molding rubber products.78
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Bilski rejected a process “for
instructing buyers and sellers how to protect against the risk of price
fluctuations in a discrete section of the economy.”79 The Court repeated the
principles established in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers that “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are “part of the storehouse
of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to

Chakrabarty had to introduce new genetic material within a cell.” Id. Although that
explains the difference in the comparison of chemical compositions, the Supreme
Court clearly considered the additional function of the plasmid-enhanced bacteria
as a significant distinction from the natural bacteria.
72
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. Subsequently in J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer HiBred Int’l, Inc., the Supreme Court confirmed that the distinction the Court
considered crucial under § 101 was between “products of nature, whether living or
not, and human-made inventions,” and held that the Plant Variety Protection Act
and the Plant Patent Act of 1930 were not the exclusive means of obtaining a patent
for human-developed plant breeds. 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (quoting Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. at 313).
73
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
74
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Id. at 192.
78
Id. at 192–93. For a criticism of the Court’s decision in Diehr, see Sarnoff, supra
note 15, at 77 (“Diehr, like Benson, thus imposed needless confusion by permitting
the creativity of the ineligible discovery to contribute directly to the eligibility of a
claimed application without considering whether there was any additional creativity
in the application itself.”).
79
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
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none.”80 The Court then emphasized that these exceptions were consistent
with the requirement that to be patentable, a process must be “new and
useful.”81 As Professors Demaine and Fellmeth have pointed out, “By its
plain terms, the requirement that an invention be ‘new’ requires that the
claimed product or process must not have previously existed in nature.”82
In his concurring opinion in Bilski,83 Justice Breyer stated that he
summarized the views of all the Justices when noting the Court has long
held “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable” under § 101.84 He further
emphasized that “allowing individuals to patent these fundamental
principles would “wholly pre-empt” the public’s access to the “basic tools
of scientific and technological work.”85 Justice Breyer likewise observed
that “[t]he Court has thus been careful in interpreting the Patent Act to
‘determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.’”86
The following section examines in detail the Supreme Court’s next
decision on patentable subject matter, Prometheus. This unanimous decision
sets forth further guidance on what is free for all to use and should guide the
outcome in Myriad Genetics.

D. Prometheus
1. Background
Prometheus centered on the validity of patents for diagnosing the
use of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of certain diseases.87 The legal issue
80

Id. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
81
Id. at 3225.
82
Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: a
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 303, 386 (2002). See Part II.C, infra, for further discussion of “new” in
§ 101.
83
Justice Scalia concurred in the part of Justice Breyer’s opinion discussed in this
paragraph.
84
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
85
Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67).
86
Id. at 3258 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 151 (1989)).
88
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–96
(2012). The representative claim quoted by the Court was the following claim 1 of
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 ('623 Patent): “A method of optimizing therapeutic
efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6–thioguanine to a subject having said immunemediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level of 6–thioguanine
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revolved around the inherent reaction of human bodies to synthetic
chemicals inserted into the body. Scientists had known that the levels of
certain metabolites88 of thiopurine drugs were correlated to the effectiveness
or harm of the drug in individuals, but they had not known the precise
correlations.89 Prometheus’s patent claims “identified these correlations
with some precision” and added that the result of the process indicated a
need to decrease (or increase) the level of thiopurine drug administered.90
Given this, a doctor using the Mayo Collaborative Services test (a slightly
different test than specified by the patent) could violate the patent even if
she did not actually alter her treatment decision.91
Confirming its precedents, the Supreme Court cited five of its
earlier decisions going back to 1854 as the foundation for its statement that
“‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not
patentable.”92 The Court likewise reiterated that such subjects were not
in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the
level of 6–thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x10 8 red blood cells indicates
a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said
subject and wherein the level of 6–thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per
8x10 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug
subsequently administered to said subject.” Id. at 1295 (citation omitted). The claim
used the word “method,” but the Court used “process” to describe the claim at
issue. Id. The Supreme Court noted, “[t]he District Court found that Mayo's test
infringed claim 7 of the '623 patent. . . . The number Mayo used (450) was too close
to the number the claim used (400) to matter given appropriate margins of error.”
Id. at 1296 (citation omitted).
88
“Metabolism” is the “sum total of biochemical reactions carried out by an
organism.” H. ROBERT HORTON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY 819 (4th ed.
2006) [hereinafter BIOCHEMISTRY]. A “metabolite” is an “intermediate in the
synthesis of degradation of biopolymers and their component units.” Id. A
“biopolymer” is a “biological macromolecule in which many identical or similar
small molecules are covalently linked to one another to form a long chain. Proteins,
polysaccharides, and nucleic acids are biopolymers.” Id. at 812.
89
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. The Court also noted that individuals
metabolized thiopurine drugs differently.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1296. Prometheus was not the inventor, but the “sole and exclusive licensee
of the patents” who sold “diagnostic tests that embody the processes the patents
describe.” Id. at 1295. Prometheus sued Mayo Collaborative Services for
administering a test using a slightly different correlation. See supra note 87.
92
Id. at 1293 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233–34 (2010); Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
156, 175 (1852); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853)). The
Supreme Court also cited Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371
(1841) (an English patent case). Diehr, Bilski, and Harford involved process
claims, whereas Chakrabarty and Tatham involved product claims. Morse involved
both product and process claims. Except for the earlier Federal Circuit decisions in
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patentable, as they formed the basis for scientific and technological
research.93 The Court also repeated the refrain that “monopolization of those
tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more
than it would tend to promote it.”94
The Supreme Court in Prometheus recognized a continuum from
unpatentable laws of nature to patentable applications, observing that
“[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”95 The Court cautioned, however, that
in order to be patentable, “one must do more than simply state the law of
nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’”96
The Supreme Court listed the following considerations for
interpreting the validity of patent applications that focus on a law of nature:
•

Is the claim simply a draftsman’s trick to circumvent
the prohibition against patenting laws of nature;97

•

Would the claim—if approved—“too
preempt” a law of nature;98

•

Does the claim have an element evidencing an
“inventive concept” beyond the law of nature;99 and

•

Is any element in addition to the law of nature simply
an attempt to limit the use of the law of nature to a
particular technological environment or insignificant
activity after determining how the law of nature

broadly

Prometheus, the Court did not cite a single Federal Circuit case as precedent. The
Prometheus Court referred to these four items as an “important implicit exception”
to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. Since the statutory requirement
that claimed subject matter must have been invented by the applicant and must be
new (see II-B and C of this article) is fully consistent with the law of nature and
phenomena of nature “exclusion,” this article refers to these principles as
exclusions rather than exceptions. Whether the “abstract idea” exception is also
inherently a part of the language of § 101 is a separate question beyond the scope of
this article.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1294 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (1981)) (citations omitted). It also
said, “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of
nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas.” Id. at 1293.
96
Id. at 1294 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)).
97
Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
98
Id. (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. at 112–20; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72).
99
Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594). The Court used the word “inventive” five
times. See id. at 1294, 1299, 1300, 1305.
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applied in the situation described.100
The Court found101 that: (1) the steps in the processes at issue (apart
from the natural laws themselves) “involve well-understood, routine,
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”102
and (2) “the patents would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the
underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further
discoveries.”103
2. Holding in Prometheus
Part II of the Court’s decision started by identifying the law of
nature covered by the claim: the “relationships between concentrations of
certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a
thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”104 The Court then
100

Id. at 1294 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Diehr, 450
U.S. at 191–92).
101
The Court said, “[w]e find that the process claims at issue here do not satisfy
these conditions.” Id. It is apparent the Court was referring there to a legal finding
or conclusion, rather than a finding of fact. Patentable subject matter is a question
of law, subject to underlying factual questions. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,
975 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958
F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
102
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 1296. The conclusion that the correlation is a law of nature has not gone
unchallenged. See, e.g., Denise DeFranco, Mayo, A Force to Be Reckoned With, 4
LANDSLIDE, 24, 24, 27 (July–Aug. 2012) (“Because there is no law of nature
concerning a precisely ‘correct’ concentration for a nonharmful, yet therapeutic,
effect, the Prometheus patent expressed the discovery as a range of
concentrations.”). It is not clear what the basis is for Ms. DeFranco concluding
“there is no law of nature concerning a precisely ‘correct’ concentration.” How
does Ms. DeFranco, or anyone, know? Moreover, whether or not it is a law of
nature or physical phenomena, the patentee claimed it is. The claimed correlation
might not be exactly correct, but if the patent had been upheld, it would have
prevented Mayo from using its test, which test used a slightly different correlation,
and which might have been a more correct correlation. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at
1296. The Supreme Court has not limited the exclusion of claims of laws of nature
to accurate claims. Inaccurate claims could have just as harmful effects on
innovation as accurate claims, and limiting the exclusion to accurate claims could
make the exclusion impossible to administer. See, e.g., Anita Krishnakumar,
Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 251 (2010) (“[T]he opinions authored
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito exhibited the highest rates
of reliance for interpretive tools that promote legal-landscape coherence—that is,
other statutes, the dictionary rule, and practical consequences emphasizing
administrabilty-based concerns.”). Inventors could claim a slightly “inaccurate”
correlation and nevertheless argue that a court enjoin the accurate correlation/claim.
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posed the question whether the claims added enough to the relationships to
constitute patentable applications.105 It explained that there must be
“additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”106
The Supreme Court examined each step separately and in the
aggregate, and held that the steps were “not sufficient to transform
unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications” of the law of
nature.107 It concluded that the “administering step” did not add anything to
the law of nature, because it referred to doctors who by definition were
already treating patients with thiopurine drugs.108 The Court also noted that
the two “wherein” steps did not add anything to the law of nature because
they were “at most . . . a suggestion that he should take those laws into
account when treating his patient.”109 The “determining step” did not limit
the doctors in any way, because they could “determine the level of the
relevant metabolites . . . through whatever process” they chose to use.110
Then, considering all the claim elements together, the Court concluded that
the three steps in combination added “nothing to the laws of nature that is
not already present when the steps are considered separately.”111 Finally, the
Court observed that the steps in the claims beyond the laws of nature were
routine steps that the scientific community already understood and
employed.112 Put another way, there was nothing inventive in the steps.

See the Supreme Court discussion of district court conclusion on that issue in
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1296. See 5B CHISUM, supra note 20, at § 18.04, 18-552–
60 (including an extended discussion of the doctrine of equivalents).
105
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (emphasis in original).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1298.
108
Id. at 1297. The administering step provided, “(a) administering a drug
providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal
disorder.” Id. at 1295.
109
Id. at 1297. The first “wherein” step was if the level of the 6-thioguanine
metabolite was below a certain level (indicating a need to increase the amount of
the thiopurine drug), and the second “wherein” step was if the level of 6thioguanine was greater than a different specified level (indicating a need to
decrease the amount of the thiopurine drug). Id. at 1295.
110
Id. at 1297. The determining step provided, “(b) determining the level of 6thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.”
Id. at 1295.
111
Id. at 1298. The additional steps/limitations were “well-understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.” Id. In other
words, the Court ultimately analyzed the steps in the aggregate.
112
Id.
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The Court then noted that consideration of Parker v. Flook,
Diamond v. Diehr and Bilski v. Kappos reinforced its conclusion.113 In
Flook, the Court rejected a method that used a formula to update alarm
limits during a catalytic conversion process.114 In Prometheus, the Court
noted that the claim elements in Flook beyond the formula “were all ‘well
known,’ to the point where, putting the formula to the side, there was no
‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application of the formula.”115
Explaining the result in Flook, the Prometheus Court also said, “‘[P]ostsolution activity’ that is purely ‘conventional or obvious’ . . . ‘can[not]
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.’”116
In Diehr, the Court held that a patent for a method of molding raw,
uncured rubber into a variety of cured molded products that included the use
of the Arrhenius equation constituted patentable subject matter.117 The
Prometheus Court explained that the steps in the Diehr patent “apparently
added to the [Arrhenius] formula something that in terms of patent law's
objectives had significance.”118 By referring to “no inventive concept” to
explain Flook and “added … something…of…significance” to explain
Diehr, the Prometheus Court focused on adding something significant,
inventive, to the law of nature to support patentable subject matter.119
In Bilski, the Court held that a process for hedging risks relating to
price changes constituted an abstract idea and was therefore unpatentable

113

Id. at 1298–300. The Court also discussed Benson v. Gottschalk as an example
of overly broad claims and an 1841 English patent case, Neilson v. Hartford,
upholding a patent for an improved furnace, “since [the patent] explained how the
principle [use of hot air worked better than cold air in the furnace] could be
implemented in an inventive way.” Id. at 1300–01.
114
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
115
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.
116
Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).
117
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–78, 192 n.2; Prometheus, 132 S. Ct.
at 1298; supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
118
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.
119
Many scholars have suggested that the different results in Flook (not
patentable subject matter) and Diehr (patentable subject matter) are difficult to
reconcile. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 82, 89 & n.38 (2012). As Professor Chao points out, the Court in
Prometheus tried to distinguish Flook from Diehr by saying that the “other steps
[in Diehr] apparently added to the formula something [without identifying the
something] that in terms of patent law’s objective had significance.” Id. at 88;
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192–93. The apparent tension between the two decisions may
be a reflection that although patentable subject matter is a question of law, there
can be underlying facts which affect the determination of the legal question. See
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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subject matter.120 The Prometheus Court pointed out that Bilski confirmed
that simple “field-of-use” limits did not turn an unpatentable idea into
patentable subject matter. It explained, “The fact that some of the claims
limited hedging to use in commodities and energy markets and specified
that ‘well-known random analysis techniques [could be used] to help
establish some of the inputs into the equation’ did not undermine th[e]
conclusion” that it was unpatentable subject matter.121 In other words, the
“inventor” must add something that was not well-known to turn
unpatentable subject matter into a patentable application.
In addition, the Prometheus Court cited a number of scholarly
works on the risks of overly broad patent claims foreclosing more future
innovation than the underlying discovery could justify.122 The Court did not
adopt the arguments of these eminent scholars as the motivating principles
for its holding in Prometheus, but instead agreed that these arguments
“reinforces our conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not
patent eligible, while eliminating any temptation to depart from case law
precedent.”123
3. Importance of “new” in § 101 and inventive concept for laws of nature
In part III of Prometheus, the Court specifically addressed and
rejected four of Prometheus’s arguments.124 First, it rejected the argument
that the patent claim met the Bilski transformation test.125 Although the
Court recognized that the machine or transformation test was a useful and
important clue, it emphasized it had never said “the test trumps the ‘law of
nature’ exclusion.”126 Second, the Court rejected Prometheus’s argument
that the Federal Circuit’s decision should be affirmed because the particular
law of nature reflected in the patent claim was narrow and specific.127 It
120

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010). See also notes 79–86 and
accompanying text.
121
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1300–01.
122
Id. at 1301–02 (citing Life After Bilski, supra note 14; CREATION, supra note 14,
at 112; ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at 305–306.
123
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302.
124
Id.
125
Id. For a detailed discussion of the machine-or-transformation test, see CHISUM
TREATISE, supra note 20, at § 1.03[6][k], pp. 1-329-330.4.
126
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (emphasis in original) (referring to the
“machine-or-transformation test” discussed in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225–27).
127
Id. (“[O]ur cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature
according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow . . .
[T]he cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature,
mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily
administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”).
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declined to consider the argument (without examining the accuracy of the
facts asserted) that denying patent eligibility would interfere significantly
with medical research, particularly in diagnostics.128
More significant is the Supreme Court’s response to the argument
about the word “new” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the adoption by Congress of
the “novelty” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102 in the 1952 Patent Act.129
Some courts and scholars had argued that the adoption of the separate
statutory novelty requirement essentially repealed by implication the word
“new” in § 101, whereas others argued they were two separate
requirements.130
The Prometheus Court resolved the argument by holding that the
two requirements—“new” in § 101 and “novelty” in § 102—were different
128

Id. at 1304–35. The Court noted, “[t]he American Medical Association, the
American College of Medical Genetics, the American Hospital Association, the
American Society of Human Genetics, the Association of American Medical
Colleges, the Association for Molecular Pathology, and other medical organizations
tell us that if ‘claims to exclusive rights over the body’s natural responses to illness
and medical treatment are permitted to stand, the result will be a vast thicket of
exclusive rights over the use of critical scientific data that must remain widely
available if physicians are to provide sound medical care.’ . . . we must hesitate
before departing from established general legal rules lest a new protective rule that
seems to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in another . . . We
need not determine here whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection
for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.” Id.
129
See CHISUM TREATISE, supra note 20, at OV-12-13 (“Whether Congress
intended to repudiate the Supreme Court’s stringent ‘invention’ decisions leading
up to Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea[, 340 U.S. 147 (1950),] or merely to codify
existing standards was a matter of dispute among the lower courts and
commentators.”). As enacted by the Patent Act of 1952, § 102 only contained the
word “novelty” in the title. That and three clauses in § 102—clauses (a), (e) and (g)
before the effective date of the America Invents Act (“AIA“)—have been cited as
the novelty requirement. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW (3rd ed. 2009), at
139 [hereinafter MUELLER PATENT LAW]. The passage of the “AIA worked
significant changes to U.S. patent law, including redefining what counts as prior art.
The practical result . . . is that the U.S. patent system will operate under a dual
regime ('pre-AIA' and 'post-AIA' rules) for 30 years or more after the AIA's
enactment.” JANICE M. MUELLER, MUELLER ON PATENT LAW: PATENTABILITY AND
VALIDITY (2012) [hereinafter MUELLER TREATISE), Chapter 7 explanatory note at
7-5 through 7-6. None of the complexities about pre-AIA and post-AIA concerning
novelty and § 102, however, can change the analysis of the word “new” in § 101,
since the AIA did not amend § 101.
130
Compare Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 602
n.74 (2008) [hereinafter Everything is Patentable] with Demaine & Fellmeth, supra
note 82, at 361, 364 (“[T]he requirement that an invention be ‘new’ requires that
the product or process must not have previously existed in nature.”).
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but overlapping. As amicus, the United States government had argued that
“virtually any step beyond a statement of a law of nature itself should
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a potentially patentable
application sufficient to satisfy § 101’s demands” and that the novelty
requirement of § 102, the non-obvious requirement of § 103, and the
description requirements of § 112 could perform any necessary screening
that remain.131 The Court rejected that argument as inconsistent with prior
law and pointed out that such an “approach . . . would make the ‘law of
nature’ exception to § 101 patentability a dead letter.”132 Although
acknowledging that the § 101 and § 102 inquiries might at times—but
would not always—overlap, the Court cautioned against shifting the patenteligibility inquiry to §§ 102 and 103 and risking “creating significantly
greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work
that they are not equipped to do.”133
In her article cited by the Supreme Court in Prometheus in
reference to work that § 102 is not equipped to do,134 Professor Rebecca S.
Eisenberg identified the work for § 101:
Each of the categories listed in [§ 102] . . . identifies a prior source of
human knowledge with no mention of products or phenomena of
nature that have not yet come to the attention of humans. . . . In other
words, without assistance from the doctrine of patentable subject
matter, newly discovered products and phenomena of nature do not
seem to qualify as prior art under § 102 alone.135

Professor Eisenberg concluded that the patentable subject matter
requirements of § 101 provide “an additional tool for limiting the scope of
patents that might otherwise unduly impede future research.”136 In
particular, Professor Eisenberg noted that “[d]octrinal redundancy is a
common feature of legal systems and may make sense if the interest at stake

131

Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. The United States had argued that the patent
application would “likely fail for lack of novelty under § 102.” See id.
132
Id. (citations omitted).
133
Id. at 1304.
134
Id.
135
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom Of The Ages Or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable
Subject Matter For Diagnostic Methods After In Re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RESERVE
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 54–55 (2012).
136
Id. at 64. See also Michael D. Davis, The Patenting Of Products Of Nature, 21
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 293, 332–33 (1995) (“The novelty issue is
essentially resolved . . . by determining whether the invention was known or used
prior to its discovery by the patentee . . . . [I]n the Supreme Court’s view, the
‘product of nature’ exclusion exists apart from any question of novelty in section
102.”).
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is important.”137
The Court in Prometheus did not detail precise rules for
determining what was “new” within the meaning of § 101, but instead set
forth a broad standard—”inventive concept”138 —as a guide for
distinguishing unpatentable physical phenomena and laws of nature from
potentially patentable applications of such phenomena and laws.139 This is
an important step in clarifying that the building blocks of knowledge and
principles behind them remain free from patent law for all to use.
Furthermore, the Court did not slip in “inventive concept” as dicta
in Prometheus. Immediately after citing Flook, Morse, and Gottschalk, the
Court restated the principle from these cases: “they insist that a process that
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an inventive concept,’
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”140 Similarly, the Supreme Court in
Flook said:
“Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may
be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be
patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot
support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its
application.”141

Therefore, the Court in both Prometheus and Flook tied the inventive
concept requirement for patentable subject matter to situations in which the
patent application focused on a law of nature or natural physical
phenomenon.
The Supreme Court even discussed an English patent case, Neilson
v. Harford, to provide guidance on the meaning of “inventive concept.”142
Although the patent in Neilson reflected the principle that “hot air promotes
137

Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 50.
See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
139
See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards On The Forefront Of Patentability, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 611, 623 (2009) (“Clear rules can provide the certainty
that encourages investment both in obtaining and developing the rights, but
standards can provide the flexibility to accommodate the hew and unpredictable
wonders of human ingenuity . . . [T]he law defining limits of patentability has
generally been hostile to rule-based approaches, and that hostility has been
especially apparent for rules of exclusions at the Supreme Court.”). See also
Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 14 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s preference for
bright-line rules and the Supreme Court’s decisions typically stating broad openended principles).
140
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594).
141
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (1978) (emphasis added).
142
See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1300.
138

No. 2]

DUKE LAW & TECH REVIEW

460

ignition [in a furnace] better than cold air,” it also “included . . . several
unconventional steps (such as inserting the receptacle, applying heat to the
receptacle externally, and blowing the air into the furnace).”143
The Prometheus Court therefore highlighted the Neilson patent as
an example that “explained how the principle could be implemented in an
inventive way,”144 or in other words, specific steps that had not been used
before the principle had been discovered.

E. The Standard—Protecting Basic Building Blocks
Prometheus is not a recent aberration, but affirms principles
recognized by over 150 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court
has applied the principles in the case of product patents145 and process
patents.146 Moreover, much leading scholarship regarding patent law,
including biotechnology patents and articles cited by the Supreme Court in
Prometheus, supports the Court’s application of these principles to DNA
segments.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Prometheus, Justice Breyer
discussed in detail the importance of the boundaries for patent rights. He
repeated twice the Court’s statement in Gottschalk that the basic tools of
scientific and technological work were not patentable.147 He also referred to
the concern about preemption, observing that “upholding the patents would
risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws,
inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries.”148 Justice Breyer
then explained that “the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which
serves as a somewhat more easily administered proxy for the underlying
'building-block' concern.”149 Justice Breyer said, “The exclusion from patent
law of basic truths reflects . . . ‘the enormous transaction costs that would

143

Id.
Id.
145
See, e.g., Am. Fruit Growers, supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; Funk
Bros., supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; Chakrabarty, supra notes 63–70
and accompanying text.
146
See Morse, supra note 39 and accompanying text (both product and process);
Gottschalk, supra note 59 and accompanying text; Bilski, supra note 79.
147
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1301 (emphasis added).
148
Id. at 1294.
149
Id. at 1303. Although the exclusions of laws of nature and physical phenomena
are bright-line prohibitions, determining the dividing line between an unpatentable
law of nature and a patentable application is in practice a standard. See supra Part
I.D.1.
144
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be imposed on would-be users’ of those truths.”150 Justice Breyer added that
patents on such basic truths threatened to inhibit the future development of
medical treatment recommendations.151
Justice Breyer cited and quoted from a number of scholarly articles
to support his concern about patenting basic research.152 For instance,
Justice Breyer cited Professor Eisenberg’s article discussing the Court’s
Bilski decision.153 In that article, Professor Eisenberg concluded that the
language in Supreme Court decisions excluding “basic tools of scientific
and technological research” hinted at a policy justification to “guide courts
today in adapting patentable subject matter doctrine to inventions at the
current forefronts of technology.”154 Justice Breyer also cited “Life After
Bilski,”155 in which the authors argued that ideas and natural phenomena
were free to all and reserved exclusively to none unless “the patent claims
describe the application of human knowledge to a practical end, rather than
merely identification of the existence of useful properties.”156 It is
reasonable to conclude that the unanimous Court in Prometheus cited these
articles to clarify the boundaries of patent law so courts would apply in the
future this broad standard for exclusion from patent protection. These
articles are also consistent with a series of other scholarly articles
specifically addressing patentable subject matter in the case of
biotechnology.
In two seminal 2003 articles challenging the validity of isolated
DNA patents, Professors John M. Conley and Roberte Makowski argued for
a robust public domain in biotechnology.157 They declared, “If the product
itself is substantially the same as its natural counterpart, it fails the statutory

150

Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14,
at 304–305).
151
Id. at 1302.
152
See id. at 1294, 1295, 1303 (“[U]pholding the patents would risk
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their
use in the making of further discoveries. . . . The patent claims at issue here set
forth processes embodying researchers’ findings that identified these correlations
with some precision . . . The patent claims seek to embody this research in a set of
processes . . . . [E]ven a narrow law of nature (such as the one before us) can inhibit
future research.“); ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at 306.
153
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 135).
154
Eisenberg, supra note 131, at 8, 64.
155
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (citing Life After Bilski, supra note 14). See also
Everything is Patentable, supra note 130, for an earlier argument from one of the
law journal article’s authors, Michael Risch, that everything is patentable subject
matter.
156
Id. at 1329.
157
See Conley & Makowski, supra note 54, at 306.
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subject matter test, regardless of how it is produced.”158 They rejected the
idea that claims using “isolated,” “purified,” or “synthesized” should
reflexively receive a patent. Instead, after reviewing “more than a hundred
years of precedent,”159 they concluded that “[w]here a claimed invention has
a natural counterpart, it must be shown to differ from that counterpart in
substance, not merely in degree.”160
In 2004 and 2011, Professor Kane analyzed the patentability of a
gene as both a “static chemical compound” and a “dynamic template
executed through the genetic code.”161 Professor Kane suggested that “DNA
gene sequences . . . actually embody a law of nature, as each sequence will
govern (and dictate) the execution of a fixed relationship between DNA and
protein.”162 She concluded that, gene patenting therefore “results in the
constructive preemption of the genetic code.”163 In her 2011 article, she
analyzed the basis for the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas exclusion, and observed that “[t]he underlying rationale for the
exclusions is that scientific advances depend on an available substrate of
basic knowledge and that, therefore, patenting the intellectual foundations
of a field has an adverse effect on its progress.”164
In a 2011 article, Allen Yu noted the limits that the Constitution
imposed on patent rights covering basic tools of scientific and technological
work.165 He argued, “[T]he Court should redefine its vague and relatively
weak judicial prohibition against the patenting of nature and abstract ideas
in terms of a stronger, more explicit prohibition against the patenting of
‘basic tools of scientific and technological work.’”166 He continued that any
knowledge constituting a basic tool of scientific and technological work—
the patenting of which will more likely impede than promote the progress of
innovation—should be deemed ineligible for patenting.”167

158

Conley & Makowski, supra note 71, at 392.
Id. at 397.
160
Id.
161
Eileen M. Kane, Splitting The Gene: DNA Patents And The Genetic Code, 71
TENN. L. REV. 707, 712 (2004); Kane, supra note 26.
162
Béné v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 686 (1889) (emphasis added).
163
Kane, supra note 161, at 753. See also id. at 741, 742 (noting, “the strict
compositional analysis . . . does not adequately account for the value of a DNA
gene sequence claim . . . [because] the genetic information survives chemical
reformatting from DNA to mRNA to cDNA“).
164
Kane, supra note 26, at 2.
165
Yu, supra note 15, at 428–30.
166
Id. at 428.
167
Id. at 428–29. See id. at 430 (acknowledging that the question of what
constituted a basic tool would not necessarily lead to an easier resolution and
arguing, “The main advantage of this requirement is that instead of focusing on
159
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In short, certain “building blocks” of nature are free from patent
enclosure; they are free for all to use.168 As a standard, however, it remains
too vague to guide lower courts. Something more is necessary. Supreme
Court cases have implemented the standard through the “proxy” of
determining whether the patents at issue improperly claim laws of nature or

legally constructed notions of what is nature and what is man-made, this
requirement focuses on articulating the costs of patents.”). Many scholars have
emphasized limiting the scope of patents as an important tool. See, e.g., Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 913 (1990) (“[I]t is basic to the grant of a patent that the
scope of a patent should not exceed the scope of invention . . . the purposes of the
patent law will be adequately served if patents on compounds which are structurally
obvious from the prior art are limited to method (i.e. process) patents directed to the
new and useful characteristic or property which is the essence of the discovery or
invention.”); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 104 (2009) (“[A]s a general principle, a flexible
common-law approach of ongoing judicial oversight will best accommodate new
and different technologies within the general framework of a patent statute.”);
Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells And The Strange Effects
Of Property And Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1398–400
(2011) (“By allowing a patent on DNA segments in laboratory form, even if those
segments are entirely artificial, are we indirectly allowing the patent holder to tie up
the natural phenomenon of the gene itself in the human body? . . . The solution lies
in properly limiting the scope of the allowed claim. In a case like Molecular
Pathology, this limitation could be accomplished through the disclosure
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102.”); Burton T. Ong, Patenting The Biological
Bounty Of Nature: e-Examining The Statutes Of Organic Inventions As Patentable
Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (advancing “the
proposition that only process patents should be made available in respect to organic
inventions because they better reflect what the scientist deserves for his or her
inventive efforts and are better measurements of his or her contribution to the preexisting ‘biotechnology’ of nature”).
168
See Emir Aly Crowne Mohammed, What Is An Invention? A Review Of The
Literature On Patentable Subject Matter, 15 RICH. J.L.TECH. 2, 30 (2008) (“If we
accept this line of argument, then any scientific breakthrough that peels back
another layer of ‘fundamentality’ (which is what science does) will reveal that the
existing layer was not truly fundamental after all and that awarding patents for that
previously fundamental layer is now acceptable, ad infinitum.”). It is true that
science has advanced dramatically, but it does not follow that awarding patents for
unapplied scientific principles discovered in any particular year is acceptable,
because ultimately we will we know much more behind the scientific principle
discovered that year, so therefore what we once thought was fundamental is no
longer fundamental. In other words, the issue is not whether the natural law is
fundamental or not, but whether humans have added enough to the principle to take
the claim from a natural law to a specific application of that law with inventive
elements beyond the natural law. See supra Part I.D.3.
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physical phenomena without adding an inventive concept.169 That proxy is
actually implicit in some of the often overlooked words in § 101.

II. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN “INVENT,” “NEW,” AND “USEFUL” IN §
101 AND THE EXCLUSION OF LAWS OF NATURE AND PHYSICAL
PHENOMENA
A. Introduction
The words “invent,” “new,” and “useful,” or some iteration of
those words, have remained in the U.S. patent statute governing patentable
subject matter since 1790.170 Scholars and lower courts have tended to focus
on the four patent eligible categories in § 101 (processes, machines,
compositions of matter and manufactures) and to disregard “new” while
treating utility as a separate requirement.171 That may be because
“invention” and “inventors” are mentioned in a number of other sections of
the patent law,172 and § 102 addresses the question of novelty, which at least
on first glance seems similar to “new.”173
However, courts must consider the meaning of all the words in a
statute, and generally it is improper for a court to ignore certain words when
applying a statute.174 Although a “‘word may have a character of its own’
. . . the words associated with it may indicate that the true meaning of the

169

Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1303 (2012).
170
See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
171
See MOY, supra note 20, at § 5:1 (“The authorities refer to the two criteria
included in section 101 as the requirements of ‘utility’ and ‘statutory subject
matter,’ respectively,” with “statutory subject matter” referring to processes,
machines, articles of manufacture and compositions of matter). For a similar
discussion with a focus on four statutory categories, processes, machines,
compositions of matter and manufactures, see MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129,
at §§ 3.01–3.06.
172
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also Part I.B, infra.
173
See MOY, supra note 20, at § 5:1 n.3 (arguing that “it has occasionally been
asserted that the reference in section 101 to inventions that are ‘new’ provides the
basis for an inquiry into the state of the art . . . The large weight of authority,
however, holds that the criterion of adequate differences over the art is set out in
sections 102 and 103.). But see infra Part I.D.3 (discussing the significance of the
Prometheus Court’s discussion of “new” in § 101).
174
See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172–74 (2001) (“We begin, as
always, with the language of the statute . . . It is our duty give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute.“); Krishnakumar, supra note 104, at 236.
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series is to convey a common idea.”175 As a result, courts must consider the
“other” words in § 101.176

B. Invent
Section 101 requires a patent applicant to have invented what she
claims.177 As the Supreme Court said in Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan,
“No one is entitled to a patent for that which he did not invent.”178 In
Thompson v. Boisselier, the Court said that in order to receive a patent, the
claimant “must be an inventor and he must have made a discovery.”179 In a
175

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
860, 861 (1984).
176
See Menell, supra note 37, at 1314 (arguing that patentable subject matter
cannot evolve to meet the new challenges of the information age without
integrating eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century sources of patentable
subject matter law into a flexible and evolving body of common law that is
sensitive to history, statutory evolution, constitutional constraints, and an
understanding of modern science and technology).
177
See MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at § 8.01 (“The patented invention
must originate with the inventor. An inventor cannot merely learn from another’s
invention and thereafter claim it as his own when seeking a patent.”). In addition to
whether a person actually originated the claimed subject matter, courts have
frequently referred to “invention” or “inventive” to refer to a qualitative measure of
the difference between prior art and the claimed invention. In that context, courts
rejected patents not showing a sufficiently “inventive” leap over prior art. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875) (“[T]he application by the patentee of an old
process to a new subject, without any exercise of the inventive faculty, and without
the development of any idea which can be deemed new or original in the sense of
the patent law.”). The Patent Act of 1952 enacted 35 U.S.C. § 103, which required
that a patent not issue for any claim for which the differences from prior art were
obvious, effectively articulating what had been the court-imposed requirement of
“inventive” differences. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1976) (“As a
judicial test, ‘invention’, i.e., ‘an exercise of the inventive faculty,’ . . . has long
been regarded as an absolute prerequisite to patentability . . . However, it was only
in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of ‘uniformity and definiteness,’ articulated
the requirement in a statute, framing it as a requirement of ‘nonobviousness.’”).
Professor John F. Duffy concluded that § 103 “was designed to end the Court’s
search for a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary ingenuity and to focus
the inquiry solely on obviousness.” John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case
Study Of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 43 (2007). In Prometheus the
Supreme Court relied on the historical court-imposed “inventive” requirement
when the subject matter focused on a law of nature to assist in determining whether
enough had been added to the law of nature to transform the claim into patentable
subject matter under § 101. See infra Part II.D.
178
74 U.S. 583, 602 (1868).
179
See Thompson v. Boisselier 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885) (involving a patent for
improvements in water closets).
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general sense, “discover” can be broader than “invent.”180 As the D.C.
Circuit held in In Re Kemper, “[i]nvention is applied to the contrivance and
production of something that did not before exist. Discovery brings to light
that which existed before, but which was not known.’ A discovery, in this
sense, is not the subject of a patent . . . .”181 Thus, Kemper indicates that the
use of “discover” in the context of patentable subject matter referred to a
narrower definition of discovery synonymous with invention.182
Other federal cases in the Nineteenth Century repeated the principle
that in order to obtain a patent, the claimant must go beyond a discovery in
the general sense of the word. For instance, Morton v. New York Eye
Infirmary involved a patent for the use of ether during surgery on
animals.183 The court said that a discovery was not patentable and that to be
patentable the discovery had to be “connected … with some particular
medium or mechanical contrivance by which … it acts on the material
world.”184
Similarly, in Wall v. Leck, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed a process for fumigating trees and plants substantially in the
absence of sunlight.185 The court noted that the claimant had only
discovered that the old process of fumigation was effective if performed at
night and had not invented a machine, apparatus device, or process to
exclude sunlight.186 The court held that such discovery was not a patentable
invention and that “[a] mere naked principle, a law of nature, or property of
matter cannot be patented.”187 In short, to be an inventor, a person needs to
have passed beyond discovery in the broadest sense.
180

See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 82, at 370 (“An ‘invention,’ in the parlance
of the Constitution and early patent laws, is a new creation consciously sought and
successfully reduced to practice by the inventor. A ‘discovery,’ as used in the same
parlance, was intended to denote a fortuitous creation of the inventor and not
merely something found by him or her.”). See also Yu, supra note 15, at 431–33;
Sarnoff, supra note 15, at 64–66.
181
In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286, 287 (D.C. Cir., 1841).
182
Id. at 287 (“[I]t will be found, by a careful perusal of the constitution and laws of
the United States upon the subject of patents for useful arts . . . that it is not there
used in this [general] sense, but always as synonymous with invention.”). 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(a) provides, “The term ‘invention’ means invention or discovery.”
183
See Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862)
(involving a patent for the use of ether in surgery on animals).
184
See id. at 883 (rejecting the patent claim, as “the specification presents nothing
new except the effect produced by well-known agents, administered in well-known
ways on well-known subjects. This new or additional effect is not produced by any
new instrument . . . .”).
185
Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1895).
186
Id. at 555.
187
Id.
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Patent disclosure law has reflected the requirement of invention
since the first patent statute.188 In Evans v. Evans, the Supreme Court said
one purpose of the statutory disclosure requirement (the specification) was
to enable the public to understand what the applicant “claims as his own
invention” and could determine if that invention was already in use.189 In
Bene v. Jeantet, the Court held that a patent cannot extend the patentee’s
rights beyond what was her “real invention.”190 In General Electric Co. v.
Wabash Appliance Corp., the Court likewise held that an applicant must
provide “‘a distinct and specific statement of what he claims to be new, and
to be his invention.’”191
The disclosure statute still reflects the invention requirement in the
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.192 That paragraph has three different
requirements: (1) enablement,193 (2) best mode,194 and (3) written

188

Section 2 of the 1790 Patent Act provided in part that the applicant(s) “shall . . .
deliver . . . a specification in writing, containing a description . . . of the things or
things, by him or them invented or discovered . . . to enable a workman . . . to
make, construct, or use the same . . . .” 9 CHISUM TREATISE, supra note 20, at
Appendix 9, 9-2. Section 3 of the Patent Act of 1793 provided that every inventor
“shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or
process of compounding the same . . . .” Id. at Appendix 10, 10-2. Section 6 of the
Patent Act of 1836 provided, “before any inventor shall receive a patent for any
such new invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his
invention or discovery, and of the manner of and process of making, constructing
using, and compounding the same . . . .” Id. at Appendix 11, 11-3. Section 26 of the
Patent Act of 1870 provided, “before any inventor or discover shall receive a patent
for his invention or discovery, he shall . . . file . . . a written description of the same,
and of the manner of and process of making, constructing using it . . . .” Id. at
Appendix 14, 14-6.
189
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 434 (1822) (emphasis added).
190
Béné v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 686 (1889) (emphasis added).
191
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938).
192
The complete text of paragraph (a) of § 112 (and the first paragraph of § 112
prior to the America Invents Act) is: “The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
193
MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at ch. 4; MOY, supra note 20, at §§ 7:2–26.
194
MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at ch. 5; MOY, supra note 20, at §§ 7:44–
57. As a result of the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29 (2011), the failure to comply with the best mode requirement of § 112 is no
longer a basis for challenging the validity of a patent or as part of a post-grant
review proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).
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description.195 The purpose of the written description requirement of
§ 112(a) is to show that the patent applicant in fact possesses the invention
that she claims.196 Although historically the Federal Circuit considered the
written description requirement in connection with disputes over which
applicant for a patent had priority, the Federal Circuit held in Ariad Pharm.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,197 that the written description requirement applied
to all claims to require possession of the invention.198 The Federal Circuit
reasoned “a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of
chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the
specification . . . demonstrates that the applicant has invented species
sufficient to support a claim to a genus.”199
Of course, humans have not invented laws of nature or physical
phenomena.200 Judge Bryson emphasized this point in his dissent in Myriad
195

MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at ch. 6; MOY, supra note 20, at §§ 7:2743. Professor Landers identifies four disclosure requirements in the first two
paragraphs of § 112: written description, enablement, best mode and definiteness.
AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW, § 7.01 (1st. ed. 2008).
196
See Ariad Pharm, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (2010) (agreeing
with Lilly's argument that requires that “the specification objectively demonstrate
that the applicant actually invented—was in possession of—the claimed subject
matter”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566
(1997) (“To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must
describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can
clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’”); Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The purpose of the
‘written description’ requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make
and use’ . . . the proper test is whether the drawings conveyed with reasonable
clarity to those of ordinary skill that Mahurkar had in fact invented the catheter
recited in those claims.“).
197
Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
198
Id. at 1349, 1351.
199
Id. at 1349.
200
See, e.g., Michael D. Davis, The Patenting Of Products Of Nature, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 314 (1995) (“The basic building blocks necessary for
life have remained unchanged throughout evolution.”). Whether God or chance
resulted in the genetic code is irrelevant for purposes of determining invention,
since at least humans did not invent the genetic code. Perhaps Judge Moore, in her
concurring opinion in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), was implicitly recognizing that underlying question
when she said, “[t]he patents in question raise substantial moral and ethical issues
related to awarding a property right to isolated portions of human DNA—the very
thing that makes us humans, and not chimpanzees.” Id. at 1346 (Moore, J.,
concurring in part). In that connection, it is interesting that the two scientists who
won the Nobel Prize for their monoclonal antibody technology determined it would
be ethically inappropriate for them to patent their technique. See Rai, supra note 33,
at 94.
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Genetics: “the question in this case is whether an individual can obtain
patent rights to a human gene. From a common-sense point of view, most
observers would answer, ‘Of course not. Patents are for inventions. A
human gene is not an invention.’”201 In other words, humans have not
invented phenomena of nature or laws of nature; they have existed for
centuries. Therefore, the § 101 requirement that the applicant shall have
invented the claimed subject matter is consistent with the prohibition
against patenting of laws of nature and physical phenomena.

C. New
The requirement that a patent claim be “new” is also consistent with
excluding laws of nature, physical phenomena and the related limitation
noted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City202 : “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects
are . . . to restrict free access to materials already available.”203 Laws of
nature and physical phenomena such as gravity and the genetic code are not
new. They have been available for discovery by humans and do not satisfy
the § 101 requirement of being new.204
The Supreme Court confirmed in Prometheus that there are two
separate, but sometimes overlapping, comparisons of patent applications
focusing on laws of nature or physical phenomena. The first is a two-part
inquiry under § 101:
a. Do the claims simply reflect a law of nature or
physical phenomenon? If so, the claims do not present
something that is new, and therefore the subject matter
of the claims does not constitute a patentable subject
201

Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1348. (Bryson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
202
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
203
Id. at 6. See also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 82, at 386 (pointing out that
products and processes that have existed in nature are not new).
204
See, e.g., DeFranco, supra note 104, at 27 (“Laws of nature and natural
phenomenon are not new.”). At least before the decision in Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), there was a dispute about
the basis for the three exclusions (laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract
ideas), but recognition that these exclusions were consistent with the text of § 101.
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that “while these exceptions are not
required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable
process must be ‘new and useful.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
Professor Duffy concluded, “In sum, the traditional doctrines of patentable subject
matter—the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas, natural phenomena and
principles of nature—have survived because they have textual bases in the statute
and because they have been amorphous.” Duffy, supra note 139, at 646.
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matter within the meaning of § 101;205 and
b. If the claims reflect more than a law of nature or
physical phenomenon, do the patent claims add
enough (an inventive concept) to the natural
correlations to allow the processes or products they
describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that
apply natural laws?206 !
The above inquiry on whether or not an applicant has added enough
represents a flexible standards-based inquiry consistent with guidance from
more than two hundred years of common law.207
Therefore, “new” applies to § 101 and “novelty” applies to §§ 102
and 103. Justice Breyer said in Prometheus that “§§ 102 and 103 say
nothing about treating laws of nature as if they were part of the prior art
when applying those sections.”208 Prior art in §§ 102 and 103 only covers
knowledge disclosed by humans, so undiscovered laws of nature cannot
constitute prior art.209 A court thus should not consider laws of nature as
prior art for purposes of §§ 102 and 103, because “all inventions can be
reduced to underlying principles of nature, which, once known, make their
implementation obvious.”210 The placements of “new” with § 101 and
“novelty” to §§ 102 and 103 reflect the holding in Diehr that the novelty of
an element in a process, or the whole process, “is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories.”211
The decision in Prometheus should end the controversy that had
existed over “new” in § 101.212 “New” remains a requirement in § 101 and
is not “preempted” by the novelty requirement in § 103.213

205

Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1296.
Id. at 1294, 1298.
207
See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text (standards vs. rules); supra
notes 37, 176 (on the common law nature of § 101). Professor Duffy has suggested
that “the prohibition against patenting principles of nature still survives . . . because
it has been applied more like a standard than a rule.” Duffy, supra note 139, at 644.
208
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (2012). Although § 103 does not identify what
constitutes “prior art,” the reference to § 102 indicates the sources to consider for
novelty in § 102 are the same sources to consider for prior art in § 103. CHISUM,
supra note 20, at § 5.03[3], pp. 5-146 to -7.
209
Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 53–55.
210
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189–
90 n.12).
211
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189. See also Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 54.
212
See supra Part I.C.3.
206
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D. Useful
Another consistent requirement of the U.S. patent statutes on
patentable subject matter has been that an invention be “useful,” an
undefined term.214 Professor Landes and Judge Posner have identified two
economic purposes for the utility requirement. “One is to rule out patents on
basic research, and another is to delay the point in the development of a new
product or process at which a patent may be obtained.”215
Historically, the courts have set a low standard for what qualifies as
“useful.”216 For instance in a case involving the sale of a beverage dispenser
designed to mislead customers, the court concluded the beverage dispenser
was useful to the seller. The court reasoned that “[t]he fact that customers
may believe they are receiving fluid directly from the display tank does not
deprive the invention of utility[,] . . . even if the use of a reservoir
containing fluid that is not dispensed is considered deceptive.”217
Since 1966, however, the courts have applied a more stringent
utility requirement in the case of certain chemical and biotech claims.218 In
213

See Liivak, supra note 23, at 264 (“[M]ost claims to purified and isolated gene
sequences are invalid because such patent claims cannot meet the requirements of
the patent act when the patent act is properly interpreted to include a requirement of
originality.”).
214
CHISUM, supra notes 20; see MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at 6A, p. 235
(“[T]he statute does not define what useful (or utility) means.“); supra note 36.
Scholars often reasonably analyze the patentable subject matter separately from the
requirement that an invention be useful, while recognizing that “useful” is part of
§ 101. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (6th ed. 2012)
(analyzing “Patentable Subject Matter” in Chapter 3B1 and “Utility” in Chapter
3B2); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS (2d ed. 2011) (analyzing
“Eligible Subject Matter” in Chapter 3A and “Utility” in Chapter 3B).
215
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at 302. The third purpose they identify is
“to reduce the cost of patent searches by screening out useless inventions by cranks
or amateurs . . . .” Id.
216
See MOY, supra note 20, at vol. 2, § 6:1 (“By long-standing judicial
interpretation, an invention is generally considered to possess utility if it is
minimally useful for its intended purpose . . . The statutory requirement therefore
forms only a low barrier to patentability in most cases.”). See also MUELLER, supra
note 129, at § 10.01.
217
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
See also MUELLER, supra note 129, at 6B, p. 236 (“Utility is rarely an issue for
mechanical or electrical inventions; even novelty items, games, or toys that might
be considered trivial or frivolous can satisfy the utility requirement.”).
218
See MOY, supra note 20, at vol. 2, § 6:1 (“[T]here may be emerging a more
stringent test for adequate utility with regard to chemical products and other
inventions that have wide potential uses.”); MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at
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Brenner v. Manson,219 a case involving a process for making a steroid
whose use was not known without further research, the Supreme Court held
that the patent failed to meet the requirement of usefulness.220 The Court
noted that a product, or a process for making a product, was not useful
simply because the product was “an object of use-testing,”221 and warned
that a “patent is not a hunting license . . . [or] a reward for the search, but
compensation for its successful conclusion.”222
In a 2005 biotech case, In re Fisher,223 the Federal Circuit ruled that
a claim for expressed sequence tags lacked utility, because the only use for
expressed sequence tags was to identify nucleic acid sequences.224 The court
ruled that “an application must show that an invention is useful to the public
as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future
date after further research.”225
Before the decision in Fisher, Professors Eisenberg and Merges
argued that “one plausible reading of [Brenner] . . . is that the utility
requirement serves a timing function, leaving basic research discoveries in
the public domain until they have yielded tangible benefits and have thereby
left ‘the realm of philosophy’ and entered ‘the world of commerce.’”226 In
addition, Professor Risch observed that the practical use requirement
§ 10.01 (“The utility disputes that do arise tend to involve inventions in the
chemical and biotechnical arts.”).
219
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
220
Id. at 535.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 536. In 1999 Professor Rai suggested, “[I]nventions that were primarily
useful tools for future researchers . . . would not offer the specific commercial
utility required by the Supreme Court in [Brenner].” Rai, supra note 33, at 138.
Because of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Fisher, which is discussed next and
which strictly interpreted Brenner, this suggestion about the effect of the utility
requirement would still be applicable today.
223
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
224
Id. at 1370. The Federal Circuit explained, “An EST is a short nucleotide
sequence that represents a fragment of a cDNA clone. It is typically generated by
isolating a cDNA clone and sequencing a small number of nucleotides located at
the end of one of the two cDNA strands. When an EST is introduced into a sample
containing a mixture of DNA, the EST may hybridize with a portion of DNA. Such
binding shows that the gene corresponding to the EST was being expressed at the
time of mRNA extraction.” Id. at 1367.
225
Id. at 1371.
226
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter As To The
Patentability Of Certain Inventions Associated With The Identification of Partial
cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 6 (1996). After analyzing in depth the issue of
patentability of the EST’s in question, they correctly concluded, “Although the
matter is not entirely free from doubt, we believe that it is more likely than not that
the Federal Circuit would hold all of the claims invalid for lack of utility.” Id. at 51.
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“reveals a fundamental normative foundation of the patent system: basic
science, no matter how important and valuable, does not merit protection
and is therefore not useful in the patent sense.”227
As with the statutory requirements of “invents” and “new,” the
application of the statutory requirement of “useful” to biotech claims is
consistent with the exclusion from patentable subject matter of laws of
nature and physical phenomena.228 In light of the consistency between the
text of § 101, there was no reason for the Federal Circuit not to apply such
exclusions to the claims in Myriad Genetics, discussed next.229

III. APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE ISOLATED
DNA AND CDNA CLAIMS IN MYRIAD GENETICS
A. The Three Often-Conflicting Opinions in Myriad Genetics
The Federal Circuit’s 2012 decision in Myriad Genetics consists of
three separate opinions.230 Writing as the “majority opinion,”231 Judge
227

Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1220 (2010).
In analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski prior to its decision in
Prometheus, Donald S. Chisum argued that “[o]ne way to look at the words ‘new
and useful’ in Section 101, together with the words ‘invents’ or ‘discovers,’ is that
they limit the four categories to what the Article I patent power calls the ‘useful
Arts,’ which in turn has been translated into modern language as ‘technology.’”
Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds In the Supreme Court’s Business Method
Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 11, 33, 34 (2011).
229
This article does not suggest there is a way to turn “building blocks” into an allencompassing theory of patentable subject matter grounded in the Constitution.
Among other things, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III said (albeit in a different
context), “cosmic constitutional theories can falsely suggest simple answers to
intractable problems . . . . The theories supply ingredients of appropriate
constitutional interpretation, but only ingredients. To see them as answers is to
succumb to the notion that a document as complex as the Constitution can
somehow be bottled and pasteurized.” JUDGE J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE
RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 6 (2012). However, using “basic building blocks”
seems to be a good starting standard.
230
The initial Federal Circuit decision in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), also had three opinions by the same
judges that were extremely similar to the later decision in Myriad Genetics, 689
F.3d 1303 (2012).
231
In dissent, Judge Bryson noted, “[a]lthough I recognize that Judge Lourie and
Judge Moore, while reaching the same ultimate conclusions, have taken analytical
paths that differ in some respects, for convenience I will refer to Judge Lourie’s
opinion as the majority opinion and Judge Moore’s opinion as the concurring
opinion.” Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1350 n.2 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and
228
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Lourie concluded that all product/composition claims at issue constituted
patentable subject matter, because he believed all the isolated DNA
segments were substantially different from the DNA found in humans and
were “man-made.”232 Judge Moore was not convinced that the longer
strands of isolated DNA in claim 1233 functioned differently than the native
DNA,234 but she agreed that the smaller, isolated DNA segments did have
markedly different characteristics and functions than those of native
DNA.235 However, Judge Moore likewise upheld all product/composition
claims, largely in deference to the practice of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office [USPTO] in granting patents on similar claims for
years.236
Judge Bryson ended up dissenting “from the court’s holding that
Myriad’s BRCA gene claims and its claims to gene fragments [were]
patent-eligible” and argued that the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 were
not substantially different in characteristics and utility than those of the
DNA found in nature.237 Judge Bryson, however, agreed with Judges Lourie
dissenting in part).
232
Id. at 1308–33 (referring to “man-made” at 1325). This article focuses on what
Judge Lourie determined were representative composition claims 1 and 2 of the
’282 patent since each of the three opinions discussed whether these claims
constituted patentable subject matter. Id. at 309. For identification of each of the
claims involved, see Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1309. Judge Lourie concluded
his opinion on the composition claims by stating “the issue before us patent
eligibility, not patentability, about which we express no opinion.” Id. at 1333. The
method claims decided in Myriad Genetics are beyond the scope of this article.
233
The representative product claims of the ’282 patent are:
1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide
having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2 [“Claim 1”].
2. The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein said DNA has the nucleotide
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. [“Claim 2”].
5. An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1.
[“Claim 5”].
Id. at 1309.
234
Id. at 1343. Judge Lourie felt the functioning of the DNA segments was
irrelevant in determining patentable subject matter. See infra notes 252–260 and
accompanying text.
235
Id. at 1342.
236
Id. at 1343–48. Judge Moore also referred to deference to the expectations of an
un-named investment community and to Congress. See infra notes 280–299 and
accompanying text.
237
Id. at 1348, 1354–55 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he test employed by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty requires us to focus on
two things: (1) the similarity in structure between what is claimed and what is
found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between what is claimed and what is
found in nature.“). Judge Bryson argued that claims 5 and 6 to short DNA and

475

AFTER PROMETHEUS

[Vol. 11

and Moore that the claims for isolated cDNA segments (e.g., claim 2) were
patentable subject matter.238
1. Application of Prometheus to Product Patents
Judge Lourie discounted Prometheus because it involved process
claims. Writing for the court, Judge Lourie explained that, “[w]hile
[Prometheus] and earlier decisions concerning method claim patentability
provide valuable insights and illuminate broad, foundational principles, the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers set out the
primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of
matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”239
Judge Moore, by contrast, acknowledged that even though
Prometheus involved process claims, the application of the laws of nature
exception in Prometheus also applied to product claims such as those in
Myriad Genetics.240 In Judge Moore’s opinion, “Myriad’s argument that
Prometheus is constrained to methods is an untenable position.”241 Judge
Bryson agreed with Judge Moore that Prometheus was not limited to
process patents. Citing Prometheus, Judge Bryson reasoned that “a patent
involving a product of nature should have an inventive concept that
involves more than merely incidental changes to the naturally occurring
product.”242
2. Preemptive effect of claims
Judge Lourie rejected the concern over preemption the Supreme

cDNA segments were invalid due to overbreadth. Id. at 1356 (arguing that “[t]he
problem with claim 6 is that it is so broad that it includes products of nature (the
BRCA1 exons) and portions of other genes; its validity is not salvaged because it
includes some species that are not natural [the cDNA segments]. Accordingly, I
would hold claim 6 unpatentable.”). With respect to claim 5, he said, “The other
claim to a short segment of DNA, claim 5 of the ’282 patent, is breathtakingly
broad . . . Claim 5 would therefore be unpatentable for the same reasons as claim 1
and claim 6.” Id. at 1356–57. This article does not address claims 5 or 6, since all
three opinions on whether claims 1 and 2 address more clearly the views of the
judges on patentable subject matter, and since the Supreme Court has only granted
certiorari on whether human genes are patentable. This article argues that claims 1
and 2 are effectively claims to human genes, whereas claims 5 and 6 are claims to
segments of those genes.
238
See id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion), 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in
part), 1355–56 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239
Id. at 1326–27 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
240
Id. at 1337–48 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
241
Id. at 1340.
242
Id. at 1355.
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Court expressed in Prometheus,243 arguing that, “[a]ny preemption thus is
limited, very limited in the case of the present patents. Moreover, patents
are rarely enforced against scientific research, even during their terms.”244
The facts and law, however, conflict with Judge Lourie’s statement
and dismissal of preemption as a concern. First, the earlier part of Judge
Lourie’s opinion acknowledged that as early as 1998, Myriad’s Chief
Science Officer had notified a doctor at the University of Pennsylvania’s
Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory that “Myriad was planning to stop GDL
from providing clinical BRCA testing in light of Myriad’s patents.”245
Judge Lourie’s opinion also discussed the cease and desist letters from
Myriad and referred to Myriad bringing several patent infringement suits in
1997 and 1998, which they dismissed only “after each defendant agreed to
discontinue all allegedly infringing activity.”246 In other words, Judge
Lourie’s opinion reflected preemption from 1997 through 2015.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Prometheus already rejected
Prometheus’s suggestion that a claim to a narrow law of nature was
permitted, based on concerns with preemption.247 Specifically, the Court
cautioned that even patents on narrow laws of nature could restrict research
and that in “any event, our cases have not distinguished among different
laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they embody are
sufficiently narrow.”248 On the contrary, the Court in Prometheus noted that
its precedents have “endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting
laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serve as a
somewhat more easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building
block’ concern.”249
Judge Bryson was the only judge on the panel in Myriad Genetics
who expressed concern about the preemptive effect of claim 1.250 He
warned, “some of Myriad’s challenged composition claims effectively
preempt any attempt to sequence the BRCA genes, including whole-genome
sequencing. . . . [T]hose claims encompass unpatentable subject matter, and
243

See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301
(2012) (“The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”).
244
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1331.
245
Id. at 1314
246
Id. at 1315.
247
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (holding that “upholding the patents would risk
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their
use in the making of further discoveries.”).
248
Id. at 1303.
249
Id.
250
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1349 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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a contrary ruling is likely to have substantial adverse effects on research and
treatment in this important field.”251
3. Standard regarding laws of nature
Chemical Composition Only
Judge Lourie indicated that the only applicable consideration for
determining patentable subject matter was whether the compositions
identified in the claims were chemically identical to the native DNA strands
in human cells. He admitted that the remand in light of Prometheus might
suggest the composition claims were mere reflections of a law of nature.”252
However, he rejected that suggestion by focusing on the product and not the
genetic code, claiming “Everything and everyone comes from nature,
following its laws. But the compositions here are not natural products. They
are the products of man, albeit following, as all materials do, laws of
nature.”253
Judge Lourie affirmatively rejected any consideration of the
functioning of the isolated DNA and native DNA, in contrast to Judges
Moore and Bryson. Judge Lourie argued:
Uses of chemical substances may be relevant to the nonobviousness of
these substances or to method claims embodying those uses, but the
patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has
similar informational properties to a different, more complex natural
material. . . . [T]heir informational content is irrelevant . . . .254

While Judge Lourie clearly prefers relying on the nonobvious requirement
in § 103 to examine functioning,255 he did not explain how the function of
DNA segments could be irrelevant under § 101, in light of the express
requirement in § 101 that an invention be “useful.”256

251

Id. In addition to rejecting Claim 1, Judge Bryson argued that the claims to the
short segments were overly broad, referring to Claim 5 in particular as
“breathtakingly broad.” Id. at 1356. Judge Moore recognized the breadth of Claim 5
when she said, “For this claim to be patent eligible, all of the sequences ranging
from the 15 nucleotide sequence to the full gene must be patentable subject matter.”
Id. at 1341 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Although Judge Moore recognized that
Claim 1 “appears to simply serve the same ends devised by nature,” id. at 1343, she
did not mention preemption as a factor to consider in determining the validity of
either Claim 1 or Claim 5.
252
Id. at 1331 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion).
253
Id.
254
Id. at 1330.
255
Id. at 1303. See Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (holding that the
emphasis on inquiry is on obviousness).
256
See supra Part II.D.
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Judge Lourie concluded that the chemical characteristics of the
isolated DNA segments of claim 1 were markedly different than those of the
native DNA. First, he stated that the native DNA, unlike the isolated DNA,
“is condensed and intertwined with various proteins, including histones, to
form a complex tertiary structure known as chromatin that makes up a
larger structural complex, a chromosome.”257 He also observed that the
“[i]solated DNA has been cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone
chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally
occurring DNA molecule.”258
Yet, Judge Lourie did not explain why he rejected consideration of
the functioning of the isolated DNA when the Supreme Court considered the
functioning of the bacteria in determining patentable subject matter in
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. In Chakrabarty, the Court held the plasmidenhanced bacteria had “a distinctive name, character [and] use’” than the
natural bacteria.259 In Funk Brothers, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the combination of bacteria did not constitute patentable subject matter,
because there was no new bacteria and no additional utility of the existing
bacteria.”260
Chemical Composition Plus Function
Judge Moore considered relevant not only the chemical
compositions identified in the isolated DNA claims and the native DNA,
but also the functioning of those compositions. Judge Moore said she used
“the framework of Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty in conjunction with the
direction of Prometheus”261 and concluded that “a composition of matter
with ‘markedly different characteristics’ from that found in nature with the
potential for significant utility is directed to patentable subject matter.”262
In referring to the statement in Chakrabarty on “the potential for
significant utility,”263 Judge Moore adopted a standard more lenient than that
established by the Supreme Court. First, in Chakrabarty the Court repeatedly
referred to the functional differences between the plasmid-enhanced bacteria
and the bacteria in their natural state. For instance, the Court said that the
plasmid-enhanced bacteria were “capable of breaking down multiple

257

Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1328.
Id.
259
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (emphasis added)
(quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
260
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
261
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1340.
262
Id.
263
Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310) (emphasis added).
258
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components of crude oil.”264 Second, the Court relied on this difference in
actual functioning when it observed, “[b]ecause of this property [i.e., actual
functional differences], which is possessed by no naturally occurring
bacteria, Chakrabarty’s invention is believed to have significant value for the
treatment of oil spills.”265 The actual functioning of the plasmid-enhanced
bacteria was central to the Court’s reasoning.
Judge Moore came to two different conclusions on the functioning
of the claimed compositions. With respect to the shorter isolated DNA
segments, she stated the use of “a short strand of DNA as a primer or probe”
was a substantially different utility than the natural DNA, which could not
be used as a primer or probe266 Since the longer isolated DNA segments
could not be used as primers or probes, she stated “the chemical and
structural differences in the isolated gene do not clearly lead to an
‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature.”267 This
difference would seem naturally to lead to a conclusion that shorter DNA
segments constituted patentable subject matter, but not longer DNA
segments.
Indeed, Judge Moore acknowledged that “[i]f [she] were deciding
this case on a blank canvas, [she] might conclude that an isolated DNA
sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject
matter.”268 However, Judge Moore agreed with Judge Lourie that all of the
264

In addition, the Court said Chakrabarty’s claim was “to a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a
distinctive name, character [and] use,’” rather than potentially having such a
distinctive use. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann,
121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). The Court also referred to the claimed subject as
“breaking down multiple components of oil, Chakrabarty’s micro-organism,” not as
potentially breaking down multiple components of oil. Id. at 305 n.2.
265
Id. at 305.
266
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1342 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Judge Moore
did consider the natural functioning of the native DNA, saying, “There is no
suggestion that the human body naturally uses 15–mers as primers to synthesize
DNA, or that the attendant process of ‘probing’ a patient’s DNA to detect a
mutation is somehow a natural law.” Id. Of course, anything found in a human
body could presumably be put to a different use that the use of that composition in
the body, but if any such outside use could qualify as a sufficient change in use,
then anything in the human body would be patentable subject matter outside the
body. Accepting such an argument would “make the ‘law of nature’ exception to
§ 101 patentability a dead letter,” an argument the Supreme Court rejected in
Prometheus. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1303 (2012).
267
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (quoting Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)).
268
Id.
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product claims of Myriad Genetics constituted patentable subject matter,
based on deference to past practices of the USPTO, discussed below.269 As
a policy matter, this deference to past practices of the USPTO would seem
to place the practices of the USPTO ahead of the rulings of the Supreme
Court in Chakrabarty and Prometheus.
Chemical Composition Plus Function Plus Inventive Concept
Judge Bryson rejected in his dissent the argument that the chemical
differences between the product reflected in the claim and its native
counterpart caused the product to be patentable subject matter. He reasoned
that “merely isolating the products of nature by extracting them from their
natural location and making those alterations that are attendant to their
extraction does not give the extractor the right to patent the products
themselves.”270
Judge Bryson recited the test from Chakrabary that both similarities
in structure and in utility were important. He concluded that the isolated
genes of claim 1 failed this test, noting that “[t]he structural differences
between the claimed ‘isolated’ genes and the corresponding portion of the
native genes are irrelevant to the claim limitations, to the functioning of the
genes, and to their utility in their isolated form.”271
Judge Bryson instead applied the Prometheus inventive concept test
to the product claims. Citing Prometheus, he explained “[j]ust as a patent
involving a law of nature must have an ‘inventive concept’ that does
‘significantly more than simply describe . . . natural relations,’ . . . a patent
involving a product of nature should have an inventive concept that involves

269

See id. at 1346 ( “I decline the opportunity to act where Congress has chosen not
to. Congress at least implicitly approved of the Patent Office’s policy of awarding
patents on genes and DNA sequences. For example, Congress included, as part of
the Patent Office’s appropriations, language affirming the Patent Office’s
interpretation of section 101 to prohibit patents on human organisms.”). Judge
Lourie did not discuss deference to the USPTO, but did say that “disapproving of
patents on medical methods and novel biological molecules are policy questions
best left to Congress.” Id. at 1324–1325 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion).
270
Id. at 1350. Judge Bryson said that “isolated lithium does not occur naturally
because it reacts with air and water and thus is found in nature only as part of a
chemical compound, ionically bound to other elements . . . Once isolated, lithium
has many industrial applications, and in order to isolate lithium, it is necessary to
break ionic bonds in the lithium compounds that are found in nature. But it seems
plain that elemental lithium (like other elements) would not be patentable subject
matter.” Id. at 1351. He also argued that removing a kidney from a human being
and pulling a leaf off of a tree would make neither the kidney nor the leaf
patentable subject matter. Id. at 1352.
271
Id. at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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more than merely incidental changes to the naturally occurring product.”272
When, as in Myriad Genetics, “the applicant claims a composition of matter
that is nearly identical to a product of nature,” he argued that the following
questions were appropriate:
a. “[W]hether the applicant has done ‘enough’ to
distinguish his alleged invention from the similar
product of nature”;
b. “Has the applicant made an ‘inventive’ contribution to
the product of nature?”; and
c. “Does the claimed composition involve more than
‘well-understood, routine, conventional’ elements?”273
Judge Bryson concluded that the answer to each of these questions was “no”
with respect to the isolated DNA segments of claim 1.274 He emphasized
that the natural functioning of the claimed subject matter was crucial under
Prometheus:
The informational content of the nucleotide sequences is the critical
aspect of these molecules; the terminal groups added to the molecules
when the covalent bonds are broken—to which the majority and
concurring opinions attribute such significance—are not even
mentioned in the claims. The nucleotide sequences of the claimed
molecules are the same as the nucleotide sequences found in naturally
occurring human genes.275

As applied to claim 1, Judge Bryson found “[t]he functional portion of the
composition—the nucleotide sequence—remains identical to that of the
naturally occurring gene.”276
Judge Bryson also examined the functioning of the DNA segments
in claim 1 (“coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide”)277 when evaluating the
significance of chemical changes resulting from the isolation of the genes
272

Id. at 1355 (emphasis added).
Id.
274
Id. at 1350. Judge Bryson’s analysis is consistent with the “inventive concept”
principle used by the Prometheus Court, as well as the following statement of
Professors Demaine and Fellmeth: “[I]t is a basic precondition of patent protection
that applicants must have created the claimed subject matter through an ingenuous
mental step . . . In order for a substance based upon a naturally occurring
phenomenon to constitute an invention, that substance must be substantially
transformed from the state in which it naturally occurs.” Demaine & Fellmeth,
supra note 82, at 461.
275
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
276
Id. at 1355.
277
Id. at 1309 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion).
273
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from the native environment. Judge Bryson explained, “the fact that the
cleaved molecules have terminal groups that differ from the naturally
occurring nucleotide sequences does nothing to add any inventive character
to the claimed molecules.”278 He concluded that the “structural similarity
[between isolated DNA and naturally occurring DNA] dwarfs the
significance of the structural differences between isolated DNA and
naturally occurring DNA, especially where the structural differences are
merely ancillary to the breaking of covalent bonds, a process that is itself
not inventive.”279
4. Deference
One reason Judge Moore cited for upholding claim 1 was,
“Congress has, for centuries, authorized an expansive scope of patentable
subject matter.”280 While that is true, the Supreme Court for centuries—in
Morse, American Wood Paper, Cochrane, Funk Brothers, Bilski and
Prometheus—interpreted the patent statutes to preclude patents claiming
natural laws, physical or natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.281 As Justice
Kennedy emphasized in Bilski, “these exceptions have defined the reach of
the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”282
Moreover, as set forth above, the text of § 101 is consistent with excluding
laws of nature and physical phenomena from patent eligibility, the acts of
Congress do not suggest a different outcome than Supreme Court
precedents.
The second reason Judge Moore cited for upholding claim 1 was
that the “US Patent and Trademark Office had allowed patents on isolated
DNA segments for decades.”283 However, Judge Bryson pointed out that,
“prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the PTO had
determined that microorganisms were not subject to patenting, but the
Supreme Court gave no indication [in Chakrabarty] that it regarded that

278

Id. at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
280
Id. at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
281
See supra Parts I.B & C.
282
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
283
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1343. Interestingly, in a decision at approximately
the same time as the first decision of the Federal Circuit in Myriad, the Federal
Circuit issued Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed.
Cir. 2011). In Classen, Judge Moore dissented, id. at 1075, from the two other
judges on the panel that found two patents for a “method of immunizing a
mammalian subject” were “eligible under § 101 to be considered for patenting.” Id.
at 1060. The USPTO had approved the patents, but Judge Moore gave no mention
of deference to the USPTO and did not even mention the USPTO in her dissent. See
id. at 1076–81.
279
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view as entitled to deference.”284
Judge Moore also noted that “claims similar to the ones at issue in
this case have been the focal point of important litigation,” citing Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. and Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Russel, Inc., but being a focal point does not mean the issue was decided.285
In fact, patentable subject matter was not decided in Chugai,286 nor was it
decided in Hoechst Marion Russel.287 Subsequently, Judge Dyk even
observed in Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.288 that neither the Supreme Court
nor the Federal Circuit had “directly decided the issue of the patentability of
isolated DNA molecules” and then gave reasons supporting the argument
that such molecules did not constitute patentable subject matter.289 There
was simply no Federal Circuit or Supreme Court holding that decided
whether isolated DNA segments constituted patentable subject matter.290
284

Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1358 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Judge Lourie replied to this point, arguing that “there is a clear difference
between allowing additional patent protection where none previously existed, and
denying patent protection decades (or centuries) after the fact, thereby eliminating a
large number of property rights.” Id. at 1345. However, it seems inconsistent for
Judge Lourie to argue on the one hand that the Myriad Genetics patents presented
no preemption worry because they were about to expire and on the other hand claim
that denying patentable subject matter would wreck existing property rights.
285
Id. at 1344 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm.
Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,
126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 77 (D. Mass. 2011)).
286
Judge Moore is correct that the patent was upheld in Chugai, but patentable
subject matter was not argued. See John M. Conley, Gene Patents And the Product
of Nature Doctrine, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 109, 116 (2009) (“That Amgen's patent
was directed to statutory subject matter was taken for granted and not at issue in the
case.”).
287
The issues in Amgen were claim construction, definiteness, inequitable conduct,
obviousness, enablement, and written description, not patentable subject matter.
126 F. Supp. 2d at 137–66.
288
Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
289
Id. at 1293 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290
In what became a companion case to Chakrabarty, In re Bergy, the Federal
Circuit held that a claim for a biologically pure culture of the microorganism
Streptomyces vellosus was patentable subject matter. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A.
1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) for reconsideration in light of Parker v. Flook,
596 F.2d 952 (Fed. Cir. 1979), cert. granted. In re Bergy was dismissed as moot in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The patent examiner had rejected
the patent application on the ground that the claim did not constitute patentable
subject matter because the microorganism was a “product of nature.” The United
States Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the
application, but on the ground that § 101 precluded the grant of patents for living
organisms, a slightly different issue. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1033–34. When the
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Judge Moore also argued, “[t]he settled expectations of the
biotechnology industry—not to mention the thousands of issued patents—
cannot be taken lightly and deserve deference.”291 Yet the Supreme Court
case Judge Moore cited, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., involved the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history
estoppel292 that had been established through a series of Supreme Court
holdings,293 not practices by administrative agencies such as the USPTO.
Festo is simply an example of Supreme Court deference to the principle of
stare decisis. 294
Judge Moore selectively discussed two lower court cases upholding
patents on purified chemical products and concluded “the settled
expectations of the inventing community with respect to isolated DNA
claims are built upon the broad language of . . . judicial precedent, such as
Parke-Davis and Merck.”295 However, earlier in her opinion, Judge Moore
admitted that “mere purification of a naturally occurring element is typically
insufficient to make it patentable subject matter,” citing a number of other

rejection was appealed to the U.S. Court of Custom and Patent Appeals, that court
said, “We consider the product-of-nature issue to have been abandoned and no
longer in the case.”
291
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1344.
292
Id. (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 739 (2002)). Judge Lourie referred to both Festo and J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144–45 (2001), for the practice of the
PTO. In J.E.M., however, although the Court did refer to past practices of the PTO,
the Court also said that the “Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which has
specific expertise in issues of patent law, relied heavily on this Court’s decision in
Chakrabarty when it interpreted the subject matter of § 101 to include plants.” 534
U.S. at 145. In contrast, here there has been no federal court decision, let alone a
Supreme Court opinion, deciding that isolated DNA segments were patentable. In
fact, as described in this article, the more reasonable interpretation of Supreme
Court precedents is that such segments are not patentable. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739.
Further, in J.E.M., there had been a subsequent express amendment to 35 U.S.C.
§ 119(f) supporting the past practices of the USPTO. 534 U.S. at 145. Neither the
reference to past Supreme Court decisions in Festo nor the passing reference to
USPTO practices in J.E.M. is a basis for deference in Myriad Genetics.
293
See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605
(1950); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
294
Festo, 535 U.S. at 739.
295
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1344 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Judge Moore
cited Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958)
(involving products of the fermentation of a vitamin B(12) activity producing strain
of Fungi) and Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (involving a product which
had been isolated from the suprarenal glands).
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appellate cases.296
Judge Moore also admitted that Funk Brothers
“indicates that an invention which ‘serve[s] the ends nature originally
provided’ is likely unpatentable subject matter.”297 In deferring to the
USPTO, Judge Moore disregarded any settled expectations from Funk
Brothers and these other appellate cases that isolated products performing
the same function as in nature—such as isolated DNA segments—were not
patentable.” Also, scholars had recognized for years prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Prometheus that isolated DNA segments’ patent
eligibility remained an unresolved question.298 As a result, even if
expectations of the investing community were relevant, there was no reason
to believe that the investing community believed isolated DNA segments
were patentable.299
Judge Bryson rejected Judge Moore’s views on deference for three
basic reasons. First, he pointed out that “the PTO lacks substantive
rulemaking authority as to issues such as patentability,” and that the Federal
Circuit should only defer to the PTO to the extent of “the thoroughness of
its consideration and the validity of its reasoning.” He concluded that the
PTO had not thoroughly considered and studied the issue, so its views were
not “worthy of much weight in the analysis of this complex question.”300
Second, Judge Bryson stated that “whatever force the PTO’s views
on the issue of patent eligibility may have had in the past,” that was
lessened by the changed position of the United States.301 He noted that in
296

E.g., In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding that purified
vanadium and uranium are not patentable); Gen. Elec. v. DeForest Radio, Co., 28
F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928) (holding that purified tungsten is not patentable).
297
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1338.
298
See infra note 388 and accompanying text.
299
See also In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 600 (C.C.P.A. 1938), affirming the rejection
by the USPTO Board of Appeals of a patent for purifying ultramarine on the basis
of General Electric, 28 F.2d at 641, and Marden, 47 F.2d at 958.
300
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1357 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In
Merck, the Federal Circuit explained that “[b]ecause Congress has not vested the
Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . the rule of
controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply. Such deference as we
owe to the PTO[] . . . thus arises, not from the rule of Chevron, but solely from,
inter alia, the thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its reasoning,
i.e., its basic power to persuade if lacking power to control.” 80 F.3d at 1550. The
mention of Chevron refers to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
301
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1358. The United States filed an amicus brief in
support of neither party. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303 (2012) (No. 20101406), 2010 WL 4853320 [hereinafter US Brief]. The US Brief stated that “the
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Myriad Genetics, “[t]he Department of Justice has twice filed a brief on
behalf of the United States in this court taking the position that Myriad’s
gene claims (other than the cDNA claims) are not patent-eligible.”302
Third, Judge Bryson also pointed out that prior to Chakrabarty, the
PTO had determined that microorganisms were not subject to patenting, but
in Chakrabarty the Supreme Court accorded no deference to such PTO
decisions.303 Judge Bryson added that in Chakrabarty the Court had stated
“Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable
subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language
Congress has employed.”304
5. Summary
The differences in the views of Judges Lourie, Moore, and Bryson
set forth above on claim 1 are stark. The views of the three judges on cDNA
are much closer together. As a result of the divergence in opinions, Part
III.B. discusses claim 1 and argues that Funk Brothers, Chakrabarty, and
Prometheus require a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s holding on claim 1
and support Judge Bryon's dissent. Part III.C. addresses claim 2—the claim
pertaining solely to cDNA—and argues that the views of all three judges on
claim 2 are incorrect and misapply Prometheus.

B. Claim 1 (DNA & cDNA)
1. DNA, genes, and claim 1
Claim 1
“1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said
polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID
NO:2.”305

United States has concluded that isolated but otherwise unaltered genomic DNA is
not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” US Brief at *18. The US
Brief acknowledged that this position was different than past practice of the
USPTO, but explained that the District Court's decision had “prompted the United
States to reevaluate the relationship between such patents and the settled principle
under Supreme Court precedent that the patent laws do not extend to products of
nature.” Id.
302
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1358.
303
Id.
305
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)).
305
Id. at 1309.
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SEQ ID NO:2 (first line of amino acid sequence in the ‘282 patent)
Met Asp Leu Ser Ala Leu Arg Val Glu Glu Val Glu Asn Val Ile Asn306

Neither humans nor Myriad Genetics created the coding
relationship between the claim 1 polypeptides307 and the amino acid
sequence SEQ ID NO:2.308 Judge Lourie seemed to recognize that when he
stated “[t]he relationship between the sixty-four possible codon sequences
[groups of three nucleic acids in a DNA strand] and their corresponding
amino acids is known as the genetic code.”309
The relationship between DNA and amino acids is in fact part of the
inherent order of life.310 DNA dictates the functioning of each individual
cell in most forms of life by directing protein production at certain times
and amounts.311 Genes are the basic units of DNA that are responsible for

306

This is the list of the amino acids taken from the first line of SEQ ID NO:2. U.S.
Patent No. 5,747,282, at col. 81–82 (filed Jun. 7, 1995), available at
http://www.google.com/patents/US5747282 [hereinafter U.S. Patent ’282].
307
E.g., id. at fig. 10A to -H. See also id. at col. 5 ll. 65-7 to col.6 ll. 1-2 (note
explaining meaning of Fig. 10A to -H).
308
Id. at col. 81–90.
309
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1312. See also BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at
816 (similarly defines “genetic code” as “[t]he correspondence between a particular
nucleotide codon and the amino acid it specifies. The standard genetic code of 64
codons is used by almost all organisms. The genetic code is used to translate the
sequence of nucleotides in mRNA into protein.”).
310
See, e.g., H. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, at app. G-9, 111-2 (6th
ed., 2008) [hereinafter MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY] (stating that “virtually all the
information required for the development of a fertilized egg into an adult made of
trillions of cells . . . can be stored in the sequence of the four possible nucleotides
. . . in the human genome . . . . [V]irtually all forms of life use DNA to encode their
genetic information, and also use nearly the same nucleic acid sequence code to
specify amino acid sequence . . . .”).
311
Conley & Makowski, supra note 54, at 311. For a detailed description of DNA
replication and the production of protein by DNA and RNA, see Chapters 20, 21
and 22 of BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88. In addition to genes that encode proteins,
“all cells contain genes that are expressed only in special circumstances, such as
during cell division. Multicellular organisms also contain genes that are expressed
only in certain types of cells.” Id. at 647-8. The important biological functions of
proteins (also called polypeptides) include: acting as enzymes (biochemical
catalysts); binding for storage and transport of other molecules; providing
support/shape to cells; decoding information in cells; and doing mechanical work
such as contraction of muscles. Id. at 52-53.
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the inheritance of discrete traits in all such living organisms.312 Each gene is
typically thousands of nucleotides long and generally encodes one or more
proteins, meaning the body uses the information in those nucleotides to
produce those proteins.313 The Federal Circuit explained that “[m]ost genes
have both ‘exons’ and ‘intron’ sequences. . . . Introns are segments of DNA
interspersed between the exons that, unlike exons, do not code for a
protein.”314
Every DNA molecule is made up of four nucleotide bases—adenine
(“A”), thymine (“T”), cytosine (“C”), and guanine (“G”)—which are
covalently linked,315 or bonded together via a sugarphosphate or
phosphodiester backbone.316 Claim 1, however, does not mention either
type of backbone.317 DNA typically consists of a double helix of two
intertwined strands of DNA chemically bound to each other through base
pairing. The adenine on one strand of DNA always binds to the thymine on
the other strand, and the guanine on one strand always binds to the cytosine
on the other strand.318
Gene expression is the process by which the information encoded in
a gene causes the production of protein.319 The synthesis of proteins from
312

Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
judgment vacated. See also, Kane, supra note 161, at 708 (“Genes are identified as
the discrete units of DNA sequence that encode individual proteins and that
collectively underlie the biochemical design of any organism.”); Anita Varma &
David Abraham, DNA is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance between
Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 57 (1996) (“A gene is
a region of DNA on a chromosome whose sequence encodes a specific protein.”);
BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 647 (“We define a gene as a DNA sequence that
is transcribed. This definition includes genes that do not encode proteins (not all
transcripts are messenger RNA). The definition normally excludes regions of the
genome that control transcription but are not themselves transcribed. We will
encounter some exceptions to our definition of a gene—surprisingly, there is no
definition that is entirely satisfactory.”).
313
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
314
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1311.
315
A covalent bond is a “[s]table chemical force that holds the atoms in molecules
together by sharing of one or more pairs of electrons.” MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY,
supra note 310, at app. G-5. See also Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1310 n. 4.
316
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1310–11. For a more detailed discussion of
nucleotides, see BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at ch. 19.1.
317
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1309
318
Id. at 1311; Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181,
193–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2011) cert.
granted, judgment vacated.
319
MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 310, at app. G-9. A protein is a
macromolecule “consisting of one or more polypeptide chains. The biological
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genes involves two steps: transcription and translation.320 During the first
stage (transcription), the sequence of a segment of bases in the DNA is
copied, or transcribed, into a related molecule called RNA (ribonucleic
acid).321 RNA is also made up of nucleotides, but a strand of RNA differs
from DNA in that it has a different sugarphosphate backbone than DNA,
and the DNA base thymine (“T”) is replaced by a base called uracil
(“U”).322 This yields a strand of RNA called pre-RNA, which contains both
exons and introns.323 The introns are then excised in a process called
splicing to produce messenger RNA (or mRNA), which contains only
exons.324
During the second stage in protein synthesis (translation), the
mRNA is translated into the encoded protein “via three nucleotide
combinations called codons.”325 Each codon results in the production of one
of the twenty amino acids that make up all proteins or a stop signal that
terminates protein creation.326
2. No markedly different characteristic and no additional utility
As discussed above, Judge Lourie concluded that the isolated DNA
of claim 1 had markedly different characteristics than those of the native
DNA. Judge Lourie based his conclusion on the removal of the DNA from
the remainder of the material in the cell—such as the proteins—and the
breaking of covalent bonds (shared electrons) between the DNA segments
in the process of isolation.327 In Chakrabarty, although the Supreme Court
considered both additional utility and markedly different characteristics, the
Court did not specify any test for determining “markedly different
characteristics.” As a result, there is no clear standard for arguing that Judge
Lourie’s view of what constituted markedly different characteristics was
incorrect (in contrast to Judge Lourie’s complete rejection of any
consideration of utility). However, neither Judge Moore nor Judge Bryson
agreed with Judge Lourie on the markedly different characteristics analysis,
function of each protein molecule depends not only on the sequence of covalently
linked amino acid residues, but also on its three-dimensional structure
(conformation).” BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 822. “Amino acids are the
building blocks of proteins.” Id. at 811.
320
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1311–12.
321
Id. at 1311.
322
Id. at 1312.
323
Id. at 1312. The District Court referred to this as “pre-messenger RNA” or “premRNA.” Myriad Genetics, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
324
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1311. See also BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at
677–78.
325
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1312.
326
Id.
327
Id. at 1328–30.
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let alone utility.
Judge Moore stated “[t]o the extent the majority rests its conclusion
on the chemical differences between genomic and isolated DNA (breaking
the covalent bonds), [she] cannot agree that this is sufficient to hold that the
claims to human genes are directed to patentable subject matter.”328 Of
course, Judge Moore was half of that “majority.” As set forth above, Judge
Moore distinguished between the longer DNA of claim 1 (with no markedly
different characteristics) and the shorter DNA of claim 5 (with markedly
different characteristics).329
In contrast, Judge Bryson stated the court should consider the
chemical characteristics of DNA in light of the “informational content” in
the genetic code. He argued:
A chemical bond is merely a force between two atoms or groups of
atoms strong enough ‘to make it convenient for the chemist to consider
[the aggregate] as an independent molecular species.’ . . . [T]o argue
that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable because in its native
environment it is part of a much larger structure is no more persuasive
than arguing that although an atom may not be patentable, a subatomic
particle is patentable because it was previously part of a larger
structure . . . .330

Furthermore, Judge Bryson reasoned that on balance the “structural
similarity dwarfs the significance of the structural differences between
isolated DNA and naturally occurring DNA, especially where the structural
differences are merely ancillary to the breaking of covalent bonds.”331 The
absence of any reference to covalent bonds in claim 1 and claim 2332
supports Judge Bryson’s analysis regarding the insignificance of the
structural differences. 333
The three judges expressed different views on the hypothetical of
whether isolated lithium, which is only found in nature as a chemical
compound, would be patentable subject matter.334 Judge Lourie merely
328

Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1341–43.
330
Id. at 1351, 1353.
331
Id. at 1355.
332
Id. at 1309.
333
It is a fundamental principle of patent law that the words of a patent claim define
the extent of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc); Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
334
Judge Bryson said that “isolated lithium does not occur naturally because it
reacts with air and water and thus is found in nature only as part of a chemical
compound, ionically bound to other elements.” Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1351
329
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observed lithium was not before the court, “so we do not attempt to evaluate
the patentability of one form of lithium over another.”335 However, all three
judges expressed some views on the lithium hypothetical, which evince
important clues in considering the impact of the different positions in future
cases, particularly if the Supreme Court adopts one of their positions.
Judge Lourie suggested elemental lithium—if it was not found on
earth as an element—would be patentable subject matter. Specifically, he
reasoned that “if lithium is found in the earth as other than elemental
lithium . . . it is a different material.”336 Judge Lourie seems to believe that if
a laboratory could separate lithium oxide into lithium and other substances,
then elemental lithium would be patentable. Under that theory, there would
be no basis for rejecting the patentability of electrons or protons, if a
company separated them from their natural surroundings on Earth. Judge
Lourie’s position disregards the principle that the building blocks of science
are not patentable subject matter.337
Judge Moore, in contrast, relied on the principle that basic building
blocks are not patentable. She suggested that elemental lithium would be
patent ineligible because it is “a basic building block provided by nature.”338
Judge Moore attempted to distinguish the patentability of isolated DNA
from isolated lithium by speculating that elemental lithium must have
existed separately at some time and that “an isolated DNA sequence did not
necessarily exist before reacting further to produce the corresponding
naturally occurring chromosomal DNA.”339 Regardless of which came
first—the nucleotide sequences of the genetic code or chromosomal DNA—
the genetic code is a basic building block of life reflected in chromosomal
DNA and claims 1 and 2 in Myriad Genetics.340
Judge Bryson believed the analogy he proposed between chemical
elements and isolated DNA was compelling. He argued that “elemental
lithium (like other elements) would not be patentable subject matter, even if
(Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Lourie did not
disagree with that statement. Id. at 1332 (Lourie, J.). Judge Moore responded to
the discussion of lithium by “assuming the government’s contention that lithium
does not currently exist in isolated form in nature” is true. Id. at 1345 n.7
(Moore, J., concurring in part).
335
Id. at 1332. Immediately before that conclusion, Judge Lourie said, “because it
reacts with air and water to form, for example, lithium oxide or lithium hydroxide,
it is a different material.” Id.
336
Id.
337
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).
338
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1345 n.7.
339
Id.
340
See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text.
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it could only be extracted from nature through an isolation process.”341 He
argued that the same principle applied to genetic material such as DNA.342
Removing anything found in nature from its natural environment, or
synthetically creating it, and putting it in a test tube will of necessity cause
some changes in the substance.343 If such changes caused that composition
to have markedly different characteristics for purposes of § 101 under Judge
Lourie’s view on “markedly different”, then § 101 would be a dead letter, a
position the Court expressly rejected in Prometheus.344
It is not necessary, however, to rely on the test for “markedly
different characteristics” to conclude that the Federal Circuit erred in
Myriad Genetics on claim 1, since Judge Lourie rejected any comparison
between the utility of the isolated DNA of Claim 1 with that of native
DNA.345 Instead, he claimed that the uses of a chemical substance could be
relevant to a nonobviousness analysis under § 103, but not to a patent
eligibility analysis under § 101.346 Judge Louri’s refusal to consider the
utility of claim 1 is inconsistent with a number of court precedents and
§ 101:
1. Patentable subject matter under § 101 was the sole
issue in Chakrabarty, and the Supreme Court relied on
the additional utility of the human-engineered
bacterium to support its holding of patentable subject
matter.347 In Funk Brothers the Court rejected a

341

Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1351.
Id.
343
Two other examples Judge Bryson gave of “isolations” that could not logically
result in transforming unpatentable subject matter into patentable subject matter
included (i) removing an apple hanging from an apple tree (which would cause
some changes in the bonds which had kept the apple to the tree), and (ii) removing
a kidney from a human (which would have caused changes in the unpatentable
human organ removed from the human). Id. at 1350–51.
344
132 S. Ct. at 1303–34.
345
See supra notes 252–260 and accompanying text.
346
Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1330.
347
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303–34 (1980). Not surprisingly,
“characteristic” has more than one dictionary definition. Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged includes the
following two definitions: “a trait, quality, or property or a group of them
distinguishing an individual, group or type”; and “any of the variables pertaining to
the normal performance of a device (as the grid voltage, plate current, or tube
resistance of a vacuum tube or the voltage and watt rating of a lamp).” WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (3rd
ed. 2002). It is not important to determine whether in Chakrabarty the Court was
referring to only static characteristics or performance characteristics, because
342
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patent for the aggregation of bacteria, because the
combination had no additional utility.348 In both cases
the Court the function of the claimed subject matter
was crucial to the determination of patentable subject
matter.
2. Section 101 refers to the invention or discovery of
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter.”349 In Brenner, the Supreme
Court applied the utility requirement as a fundamental
part of the balancing of interests in granting a patent,
stating “[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility.”350 A court must
consider the existence of additional utility in
determining patentable subject matter under § 101.
3. In Prometheus, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument of the U.S. Government that § 101 should
take a back seat to §§ 102, 103 and 112 in screening
out patent claims.351 This rejected argument parallels
Judge Lourie’s view that usefulness can be better
considered as part of the nonobviousness requirement
of § 103. Citing Funk Brothers, the Court said there
claimed subject matter must have a “new and useful
end” and an “inventive concept” beyond the law of
nature.352
Given the statutory language of § 101, the Supreme Court’s holding
in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, and the Court’s confirmation in
Prometheus of the independent gate-keeping role of § 101, Judge Lourie
improperly read “useful” out of § 101 and resisted comparing the utility of
the isolated DNA with that of native DNA. Both Judges Moore and Bryson
concluded that the isolated DNA of claim 1 did not show utility beyond the
utility of the native DNA,353 consistent with the district court’s findings of

clearly the Court referred to “utility” and considered the functioning of the native
bacteria and the human-altered bacteria.
348
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
349
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
350
381 U.S. at 534. See also supra Part II.D.
351
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).
352
Id. at 1294, 1299.
353
See supra notes 266–268, 276 and accompanying text.
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fact.354 The Federal Circuit, therefore, erred in refusing to consider utility in
determining whether claim 1 constituted patentable subject matter.
3. Nothing inventive added to the product
The Supreme Court in Prometheus concluded that the patents at
issue “set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”355 The
Court drew such a conclusion even though the patent claims did not identify
any equation and required human action to trigger this relationship.356 The
Court explained, “[t]he relation is a consequence of the ways in which
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural
processes. And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a
natural law.”357
The fact that the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 had been
isolated as the result of human intervention (or synthetically created)358 does
not change the fact that claim 1 simply reflects the natural relationship
between the DNA sequence identified in SEQ ID NO:2 and the identified
amino acid sequence in patent #5,747,282.359 Indeed, claim 1 of Myriad
Genetics in fact expresses that natural law: “DNA coding for a BRCA1
polypeptide.”360
In spite of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Prometheus of adding
an incentive concept when a patent claim focuses on a law of nature, claim
1 did not contain any inventive concept, and none of the judges in Myriad
Genetics disputed that. In fact Judge Bryson pointed out that there was
nothing inventive about the ‘282 patent: “Myriad was not the first to map a
BRCA gene to its chromosomal location” and “Myriad did not invent a new
method of nucleotide sequencing.”361 Indeed, Judges Lourie and Moore
appeared to recognize there was no inventive concept added, since Judge
Lourie observed, “Genomic DNA can be extracted from its cellular

354

Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227–32
(2010).
355
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297, 1303.
356
Id. at 1293.
357
Id. at 1297.
358
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1329 (2012) (Lourie,
J., plurality opinion) (“[S]ome forms of isolated DNA may require no purification
at all, because DNAs can be chemically synthesized directly as isolated
molecules.”).
359
See supra notes 252–260 and accompanying text; Figure 10A, supra note 307.
360
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1309 (emphasis added).
361
Id. at 1348–49.

495

AFTER PROMETHEUS

[Vol. 11

environment using a number of well-established laboratory techniques.”362
Under Prometheus, claim 1 constitutes unpatentable subject matter
because Myriad Genetics did not add any inventive concept to the claim.
However, even if the inventive concept principle of Prometheus did not
apply to the ‘282 patent, claim 1 would still constitute unpatentable subject
matter under Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. The DNA of claim 1 does not
have any characteristics markedly different than those of native DNA, nor
does the isolated DNA of claim 1 have significantly different utility than
that of native DNA.363
4. Applicability of Prometheus to product claims
Prometheus applies to claims 1 and 2 for a number of reasons. First,
a fair reading of Prometheus shows that the Court did not limit the
exclusion of laws of nature and natural phenomena to process patents.364
Second, in discussing the exclusions, the Court cited favorably a number of
product patent cases involving laws of nature or physical phenomena, such
as Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers.365 Third, limiting the exclusions to
process patents would be futile, because drafters would simply include
processes within product claims through a number of drafting approaches.
Indeed, the Court stated in Prometheus, “cases warn us against interpreting
patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the
draftsman’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles underlying the
prohibition against patents for [natural laws].’” 366
For instance, in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,367 a
case involving the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the Supreme Court
observed, “precedents do not differentiate transactions involving
embodiments of patented methods or processes from those involving
patented apparatuses or materials.”368 In Quanta, the Court cited an article
362

Id. at 1313 (Judge Moore’s concurrence did not take issue with this observation
of Judge Lourie).
363
Even assuming Judge Moore’s conclusion that the shorter isolated DNA
segments of claim 1 had a different function than natural DNA, since claim 1
includes both the shorter and longer DNA segments, claim 1 would still be invalid.
364
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293-94
(2012) (stating that “[t]he Court has long held that this provision contains an
important implicit exception . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas . . . are not patentable.”)
365
Id. at 1293–94.
366
Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
367
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
368
Id. at 628–30 (in explaining its rejection of the argument that the patent
exhaustion doctrine should only apply to product claims, the Court said, “[b]y
characterizing their claims as method instead of apparatus claims, or including a
method claim for the machine’s patented method of performing its task, a patent
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by Professor Thomas stating that “even the most novice claims drafter
would encounter scant difficulty in converting a patent claim from artifact
to technique and back again.”369
Moreover, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor have in fact
declined to focus on the statutory “category” (i.e., process, manufacture,
composition of matter or machine) of individual claims in determining
patent eligibility. In CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., the
Federal Circuit said, “[r]egardless of what statutory category . . . a claim’s
language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention
for patent-eligibility purposes.”370 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals stated “[l]abels are not determinative in § 101 inquiries” and
noted that the form of the claim, whether apparatus or process, is often a
drafting decision.371
No precedent suggests that excluding laws of nature and physical
phenomena from patentability would only apply to the process claims and
not to product claims. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in American Fruit
Growers and Funk Brothers that the product claims were unpatentable in
light of the products in nature.372 As Judge Moore stated in her opinion, the
“Prometheus discussion of laws of nature (process claims) clearly ought to
apply equally to manifestations of nature (composition claims).”373 Judge
drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.”).
369
Id. at 629 n.5. Professor Thomas’s article gave the following example:
“[C]onsider the following artifact [product] claim: ‘An apparatus for measuring
activity of the autonomic nervous system of a patient, comprising: means for
obtaining ECG signals from said patient whilst said patient is at rest; means for
measuring the R-R intervals for adjacent PQRS portions of said signals; means for
generating a Poincare plot from said R-R intervals; and means for determining a
level of parasympathetic activity for said patient from the width of said plot about a
line perpendicular to the line of identity of said plot.’ A few simple changes to the
claim transforms it to one concerned with technique, in the following way: ‘A
method of measuring activity of the autonomic nervous system of a patient,
comprising the steps of: obtaining ECG signals from said patient whilst said patient
is at rest; measuring the R-R intervals for adjacent PQRS portions of said signals;
generating a Poincare plot from said R-R intervals; and determining a level of
parasympathetic activity for said patient from the width of said plot about a line
perpendicular to the line of identity of said plot.’” John R. Thomas, Text,
Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 225–26 (1998).
370
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (2011).
371
In re Application of Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 485–86 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In any
case, Claim 1 does include a process. That process is the coding of amino acids by
the claimed DNA segments.
372
See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.
373
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
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Bryson evidently agreed with Judge Moore on this point, since he discussed
and applied the Prometheus requirement of an inventive concept.374 As
Judge Bryson said, “Myriad’s argument that Prometheus is constrained to
methods is an untenable position.”375
5. No basis for deferral to the USPTO
Judge Bryson’s refusal to defer to the USPTO should have
prevailed for the three basic reasons he set forth376 and for a number of
additional reasons. First, the Federal Circuit has consistently ruled that
patentable subject matter is a question of law for which it gives no
deference to the USPTO. For instance, in Fort Properties, Inc. v. American
Master Lease LLC,377 Fort Properties sought a declaration that an
investment method patent was invalid. The District Court granted summary
judgment, finding that no claim constituted patentable subject matter and
therefore each claim was invalid.378 On appeal, the three judge panel—
including Judge Moore—affirmed the District Court and held “[i]ssues of
patent-eligible subject matter are questions of law and are reviewed without
deference.”379 Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit referred to no
deference to the USPTO or to the District Court,380 the Federal Circuit did
not in fact defer to the USPTO and held invalid each claim the USPTO had
granted.381
374

See 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294; supra notes 272–276 and accompanying text.
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1340.
376
Id. at 1357–58. See supra notes 300–304 and accompanying text.
377
Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
378
Id. at 1318 (the patent involved was Patent No. 6,292,788).
379
Id. at 1320 (emphasis added) (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Judge Bryson was on the judicial panel
in CyberSource.
380
Since the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, it is
logical to conclude the Federal Circuit was referring to no deference to the
USPTO.
381
The reference to question of law really appears to be directed to question of
invalidity. The Federal Circuit has indicated in certain situations there can be
underlying questions of fact on the question of patentable subject matter. See In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (Fed. Cir. 1992). However, to the extent
the Federal Circuit thought there were underlying questions of fact, it is difficult to
explain the Federal Circuit’s decision in light of the conflicting findings of fact by
the District Court and any failure of the Federal Circuit to conclude “clear error” in
those factual findings granting summary judgment for the plaintiff. Cf. Stuart M.
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can
Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 299-300 (2007) (noting that “the
Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no deference whatsoever to PTO
375
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Similarly, the majority (including Judges Lourie and Moore) of the
Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Bilski gave no deference in tightening
requirements for the thousands of business method patents the USPTO had
granted.382 Then the Supreme Court in Bilski in turn showed no deference to
the USPTO or the Federal Circuit in modifying the Federal Circuit’s
decision..383
Finally, and most recently, the unanimous Supreme Court showed
no deference to the USPTO's grant of patents in Prometheus.384 In fact, the
Court also implicitly rejected the “settled expectations” argument in
Prometheus, since Myriad Genetics had filed an amicus brief and argued in
part II that the personalized medicine industry was built on the settled
expectations of the eligibility of their patents.”385 Noting that several amici
had argued that denying patent coverage would interfere “with the ability of
medical researchers to make valuable discoveries,” the Court rejected such
concerns.386 The Court pointed out that the applicable “community” was a
vague concept and noted “[o]ther medical experts . . . argue strongly against
a legal rule that would make the present claims patent eligible, invoking
policy considerations that point in the opposite direction.”387 In sum, there
legal interpretations.” (citing Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2004))).
382
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 992–94 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (statistics cited by Judge
Newman in dissent).
383
In fact, the only reference to “Trademark Office” in the Supreme Court's
decision in Bilski appears to be the following footnote 35 in Justice Stevens’s
concurring opinion: “Although a few patents issued before 1952 that related to
methods of doing business . . . these patents were rare, often issued through selfregistration rather than any formalized patent examination, generally were not
upheld by courts, and arguably are distinguishable from pure patents on business
methods insofar as they often involved the manufacture of new objects. See In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 974 & n.18 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218, 3246 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations
omitted).
384
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295
(2012).
385
Brief for Respondent at 12, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373694, at *12
(capitalization in original).
386
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304–05 (stating that interfering with the ability of
medical researchers to make valuable discoveries would be an even more severe
restraint than would affecting expectations of the inventing community, but the
Court rejected concern over that more severe restraint).
387
Id. (noting the following distinguished entities arguing against patentability in
Prometheus: American Medical Association, the American College of Medical
Genetics, the American Hospital Association, the American Society of Human
Genetics, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association for
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is no legal basis for the Federal Circuit to defer to the USPTO on the issue
of patentable subject matter.388
6. Claim 1 conclusion
Because the subject matter in claim 1 is a BRCA gene, it was error
for the Federal Circuit to hold under Prometheus, Chakrabarty, and Funk
Brothers that claim 1 was patent eligible. Claim 1 reflects both an inherent
physical phenomenon (the gene—comprised of exons and introns)389 and a
law of nature (the genetic code—the correlation between the nucleotides
and the amino acids created by those exons) that humans did not invent.
Under Prometheus, there was no step, let alone an inventive step, that claim
1 added to the phenomenon of nature or law of nature that could have
resulted in patentable subject matter.
Even if Prometheus did not apply to claim 1, Chakrabarty, Funk
Brothers, and over 150 years of Supreme Court precedents required a
conclusion of ineligibility. First, the DNA segments of claim 1 did not
become markedly different from the native DNA simply because they were
“isolated” or synthetically created.390 Second, the DNA segments of claim 1
Molecular Pathology. Of course, the Association for Molecular Pathology is the
named plaintiff in Myriad Genetics.).
388
As set forth above in Part III.D.1, scholars have argued since 1990 that whether
isolated DNA segments constitute patentable subject matter is an unanswered
question. In 1990, Professor Eisenberg noted that “the patents may still be
vulnerable to challenges to their validity in the courts.” Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L. J. 721, 721–22 & n.4 (1990). In 2003,
Professors Conley and Makowski wrote that “the product of nature doctrine still has
a meaningful role to play in the protection of the biological public domain,” and
that “there is no warrant in the history of the product of nature doctrine for allowing
it to be circumvented by the mere incantation of some combination of the words
‘isolated,’ ‘purified,’ and ‘synthesized.’” Conley & Makowski, supra note 71, at
398. In 2004, Professor Kane wrote “[t]he patenting of genes . . . results in
constructive preemption of the genetic code, an outcome that conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s dictate that the laws of nature should remain in the public domain,
free for all to use.” Kane, supra note 161, at 765.
389
See MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 310 (containing the following
definition of gene: “Physical and functional unit of heredity, which carries
information from one generation to the next. In molecular terms, it is the entire
DNA sequences—including exons, introns and transcription-control regions—
necessary for production of a functional polypeptide or RNA.”); BIOCHEMISTRY,
supra note 88, at 816 (containing a slightly different definition of gene: “Loosely
defined as a segment of DNA that is transcribed. In some cases, the term gene may
also be used to refer to a segment of DNA that encodes a functional protein or
corresponds to a mature RNA molecule.”). This second sentence would include as a
gene a cDNA molecule, since those exons are what encodes a functional protein.
390
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1350–53 (2012)
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do not have any utility beyond what native DNA segments have, even if
those isolated DNA segments were considered to be markedly different.391
Finally, there was no legal basis for the Federal Circuit to defer to the
practice of the PTO based on settled expectations of a scientific community.

C. Claim 2 (cDNA)
1. Claim 2 and cDNA
Complementary DNA, or cDNA, is a type of DNA molecule
catalyzed by a protein known as “reverse transcriptase” generated from
mRNA (messenger mRNA)392 during “reverse transcription.”393 During
reverse transcription, each mRNA nucleotide serves as a clamp for the
complementary nucleotide in the new cDNA molecule as the chemical
bonds between the nucleotides of the cDNA strand form. Uracil on the
mRNA binds to and acts as a clamp for the adenine on the cDNA, adenine
for thymine, guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for guanine.394 Since “it is
synthesized from mRNA, cDNA contains only the exon sequences, and thus
none of the intron sequences, from a native gene sequence.”395 As a result of
the absence of introns, the production of proteins from cDNA does not
require RNA splicing, in contrast to the production of the same protein from
native DNA.396
(“But to argue that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable because in its native
environment it is part of a much larger structure is no more persuasive than arguing
that although an atom may not be patentable, a subatomic particle is patentable
because it was previously part of a larger structure, or that while a tree is not
patentable, a limb of the tree becomes a patentable invention when it is removed
from the tree.”).
390
Id. at 1342–44 (Moore, J., concurring).
391
Id.
392
See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
393
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198 (2010).
See also HORTON ET AL., supra note 88, at 729, 815, 823 (referring to reverse
transcriptase as an enzyme but also stating that an “enzyme” is a “biological
catalyst, almost always a protein“).
394
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
395
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1313.
396
See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F.Supp.2d at 198–99 (stating that a
scientist typically generates cDNA in a laboratory). However, cDNA does exist in
nature as a result of retroviruses (viruses that have two identical RNA strands).
MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 310, at 158. In the life cycle of a
retrovirus, “a viral enzyme called reverse transcriptase initially copies the viral
RNA genome into single-stranded DNA complementary to the virion RNA; the
same enzyme then catalyzes synthesis of a complementary DNA strand.” Id. A
“virion” is “an individual viral particle.” Id. at app. G-24. For additional discussion
of retroviruses, see id. at 159 and 229–30.
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By definition, the cDNA of claim 2 is a subset of the DNA of claim
1, since claim 2 is a dependent claim.397 Reading the two claims together,
claim 2 is: “The isolated DNA of claim 1 [DNA coding for a BRCA1
polypeptide with the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2],
wherein said DNA has the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1.”
SEQ ID NO:1 lists the sequence of the nucleotides398 in the first row below,
all coding for the amino acids identified in the second row below:399
SEQ ID NO:1 (mentioned in claim 2)
400

ATG GAT TTA TCT GCT CTT CGC GTT GAA GAA GTA CAA AAT GTC ATT AAT

Met Asp Leu Ser Ala Leu Arg Val Glu Glu Val Glu Asn Val Ile Asn

401

This amino acid sequence is the same sequence listed below in SEQ ID
NO2 from claim 1:
Met Asp Leu Ser Ala Leu Arg Val Glu Glu Val Glu Asn Val Ile Asn402

Put another way, claim 2 does not add any material, but merely narrowed
claim 1. The only difference between claim 1 and claim 2 is that introns
(non-coding nucleotides) are absent from the DNA in claim 2.403

397

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010), ¶ 4 (pre-AIA) provides that, “[s]ubject to the following
paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously
set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim
in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations
of the claim to which it refers.” (Post-AIA, the same paragraph is lettered (d) and
begins, “Subject to subsection (e).”).
398
The nucleotides are grouped in threes and called codons.
399
Each amino acid is identified by three letters, in contrast to each base, which is
identified by one letter, A, T, G or C. See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d
at 1310–11; infra notes 425–426 and accompanying text.
400
This is one line from SEQ ID NO:1—the list of nucleotides in U.S. Patent ’282,
supra note 306, at col. 69–70.
401
This is a list of the amino acids coded by the nucleotide sequence immediately
above the amino acid. Id. at col. 69–70. The amino acids on this line are
Methionine, Asparagine, Leucine, Serine, Alanine, Leucine, Arginine, Valine,
Glutamine, Glutamine, Valine, Asparagine, Valine, Isoleucine and Asparagine. See
The Chemistry of Amino Acids, DEP’T OF BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR
BIOPHYSICS
AT
UNIV.
OF
ARIZ.,
http://www.biology.arizona.edu/
biochemistry/problem_sets/aa/aa.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
402
This is the list of the amino acids taken from the first line of SEQ ID NO:2 from
U.S. Patent ’282, supra note 306, at col. 81–82.
403
See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1329 (“Claim 2 of the ’282
patent is narrower than claim 1 and reads only on cDNAs, which lack the noncoding introns present in the genomic BRCA1 gene.”) (Lourie, J., plurality
opinion).

No. 2]

DUKE LAW & TECH REVIEW

502

2. Federal Circuit’s focus on the product vs. the law of nature
Judge Lourie focused on cDNA as a product, disregarding the law
of nature reflected in the genetic code set forth in claim 2. He seemed to
rely on the government’s argument that cDNA molecules “were engineered
by man . . . [and] with rare exceptions, they do not occur in nature, either in
isolation or as contiguous sequences within a chromosome.”404 Judge
Lourie concluded that since the cDNA lacked the non-coding introns
existing in natural DNA before transcription,405 cDNA was patentable
because “[t]hey are even more the result of human intervention into nature
[than the DNA molecules of claim 1 that were not cDNA] and are hence
patent-eligible subject matter.”406
Judge Moore also focused on the cDNA as a product rather than on
the law of nature involved and emphasized that “the claimed cDNA
sequences do not exist in nature.”407 Yet in Prometheus, even though the

404

Id. at 1326. It seems reasonable to conclude from Judge Lourie's statement about
“rare exceptions” that he recognizes that in some situations cDNA was found in
nature.
405
See supra notes 392–396 and accompanying text.
406
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1329. The District Court in Myriad
Genetics granted summary judgment in part, after stating the rule that “[s]ummary
judgment is granted only where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Assoc. for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2010) (citations omitted). In contrast,
the Federal Circuit eschewed any discussion of the standard for summary judgment.
See generally Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1324–25. Even though
determining the existence of patentable subject matter is ultimately a question of
law, there can be underlying factual disputes involved in determining patentable
subject matter. See Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d
1053, 1055–56 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Whether a claim is directed to statutory subject
matter is a question of law . . . determination of this question may require findings
of underlying facts specific to the particular subject matter and its mode of
claiming . . . .”). See also In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[T]here may be cases in which the legal question as to patentable subject matter
may turn on subsidiary factual issues”). It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss whether summary judgment for either party was appropriate in light of the
differences between the findings of fact of the District Court and the Federal
Circuit's apparently fact-based view of cDNA. Regardless of whether granting
summary judgment was error as a matter of law in light of the apparent
disagreement on facts, to decide such crucial issues relating to the building blocks
of life when there are genuine disputes about the facts seems unfortunate.
407
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 698 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in
judgment). This paragraph accepts for the sake of argument Judge Moore's claim
that cDNA does not exist in nature, in spite of the contrary finding of the District
Court.
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record indicated that thiopurine drugs did not exist in nature,408 the Supreme
Court held that the patents “set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships
between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the
likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause
harm.”409 In other words, the relationship between chemicals inserted into
the human body and the reaction of the human body reflected an
unpatentable natural law, even though the claim included no mathematical
formula and the chemicals inserted were not found in nature.
Judge Bryson similarly focused on a product instead of the law of
nature involved, stating “[t]he cDNA cannot be isolated from nature, but
instead must be created in the laboratory.”410 He further stated “[t]he end
product is a human-made invention with distinct structure.”411
Contrary to the Federal Circuit panel’s focus on whether cDNA
existed in nature in the same form, Supreme Court precedents have
established that human intervention does not automatically transform a
physical phenomenon or law of nature into patentable subject matter. In
Badische, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent for artificial alizarine
produced by humans from anthracine.412 The Court held that, although the
process for making the synthetic alizarine could be patentable, the product
was not and noted that “[c]alling it artificial alizarine did not make it a new
composition of matter.”413
There was again human intervention in American Fruit Growers—
the addition of borax to the rind of citrus fruit to render the fruit resistant to
408

The lower court record indicates thiopurine drugs are man-made. In Prometheus
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2008 WL 878910, *6 (S.D. Cal. 2008),
the District Court rejected Prometheus Labs’ argument “that the claimed
correlations cannot be natural phenomena because the correlations would not have
existed without the intervention of man-made drugs.” In Prometheus Labs., Inc. v.
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Federal
Circuit rejected the argument that “Bilski does not apply where, as here, the
treatment methods use synthetic drugs and thus do not recite or wholly preempt any
natural phenomenon.”
409
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296
(2012).
410
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1356 (Bryson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
411
Id.
412
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
413
Cochrane v. Badische, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884). While John Conley and
Roberte Makowski have referred to this view of the case as “effectively dictim,”
they are mistaken. Conley & Makowski, supra note 54, at 328 n.193 (2003). This is
not dictum, because the Court did not choose between the two views of the case
when it concluded that “[i]n either view the decree of the circuit court must be
reversed . . . .” Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 313.
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blue mold decay.414 Yet the Supreme Court invalidated the patent, even
though the human-treated fruit had borax in the rind, which natural fruit did
not have, and the added borax allowed the human-treated fruit to stay fresh
longer than the natural fruit.415
Similarly in Funk Brothers the mixing together of certain bacteria
into a powder of liquid base by humans did not make the patent valid.416
Although mixing bacteria avoided inhibiting effects that certain bacteria
naturally had on other bacteria, the Supreme Court concluded, “[t]he
combination of species produces . . . no enlargement of the range of their
utility.”417 Such utility reflected “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.”418
There was sufficient human intervention in Chakrabarty for the
Supreme Court to find patentable subject matter, but that decision cannot
support the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad Genetics. In Chakrabarty,
the Supreme Court noted Congress “recognized that the relevant distinction
was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of
nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”419 In referring
to “human-made inventions,” the Court did not suggest that any human
intervention would be sufficient. Instead, the Court held that the plasmidinjected bacteria constituted patentable subject matter because it was “a
product of human ingenuity, ‘having a distinctive name, character [and]
use.’”420 Indeed, the reference in Chakrabarty to human ingenuity mirrors
the Court’s reference to “inventive concept” in Prometheus when the claim
focuses on a law of nature.421
Most recently, Prometheus also featured human intervention in
administering a drug to an individual and determining the level of related
metabolites in the individual.422 The Supreme Court held that these steps of
administering by doctors and determining by doctors were “not sufficient to
transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications.”423
The Court emphasized that its precedents insisted that a process that focuses
upon the use of a natural law contain additional elements, an inventive
414

Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931).
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
416
See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
417
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
418
Id. at 130.
419
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
420
Id. at 310 (emphasis added) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887)).
421
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294,
1299 (2012).
422
Id. at 1295.
423
Id. at 1298.
415
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concept, but the additional steps in Prometheus consisted of “wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the
scientific community.”424
Human intervention does not necessarily render the resultant
substance or process a patentable subject matter instead of an excluded law
of nature or physical phenomenon. Judges Lourie, Moore, and Bryson
appeared to disregard this principle in evaluating claim 2, even though
Judge Lourie admitted “[t]he relationship between the sixty-four possible
codon sequences and their corresponding amino acids is known as the
genetic code.”425 None of the three judges suggested that humans created
this genetic code, and indeed the District Court in Myriad Genetics held “it
is undisputed that the ordering of the nucleotides is determined by
nature.”426
3. Judge Moore’s analysis of characteristics and function of cDNA
Judge Moore discussed the difference between isolated cDNA and
native RNA and between isolated cDNA and native DNA. She said that
cDNA has a complementary sequence of nucleotides, and, as a result, a
different nucleotide sequence than RNA. She added that DNA has a
different chemical structure than RNA, including a different base (thymine
instead of uracil) and different sugar backbones (deoxyribose instead of
ribose).427 Different chemical structures result in greater stability for the
DNA than for the RNA sequence.428 Therefore, Judge Moore concluded,
“cDNA sequences thus have a distinctive character and use, with markedly
different chemical characteristics from either the naturally occurring RNA
or any continuous DNA sequence found on the chromosome.” 429
The more apt comparison, however, is between the cDNA of claim
2 and the corresponding natural DNA segment. With respect to the
comparison, Judge Moore said, “since cDNA has all of the introns removed,
and only contains the coding nucleotides, it can be used to express a protein
424

Id. at 1294.
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2012); see also supra notes 309–310. This is consistent with the definition of
genetic code in BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 816 (“The correspondence
between a particular three nucleotide codon and the amino acid it specifies. The
standard genetic code of 64 codons is used by almost all organisms. The genetic
code is used to translate the sequence of nucleotides in mRNA into protein.”).
426
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194–95
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
427
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in
part).
428
Id.
429
Id. at 1340–41.
425
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in a cell which does not normally produce it.”430 Judge Bryson concluded
“the cDNA has a utility not present in the naturally occurring BRCA DNA
and mRNA because cDNA can be attached to a promoter and inserted into a
non-human cell to drive protein expression.”431 Yet cDNA encodes the
same protein as DNA, but since cDNA is produced from mRNA, cDNA
produces the proteins without the first transcription step of natural DNA.432
On the other hand, DNA segments with introns produce the same
result—the same proteins—as the cDNA, only through an additional step.
This additional step should not lead to a different outcome in the patentable
subject matter analysis. As the Supreme Court held in Badische, “[w]hile a
new process for producing it was patentable, the product itself could not be
patented, even though it was a product made artificially for the first time, in
contradistinction to being eliminated from the madder root.”433 Similarly,
the human-performed step of mixing bacteria into a paste in Funk Brothers
did not cause the combination of bacteria to become patentable subject
matter. 434
Aside from the removed introns that do not code for applicable
proteins, the sequence of bases in claim 2 are identical to the sequence of
coding bases in native DNA and the bases of claim 2 perform the same
function as the coding bases of native DNA. As Judge Bryson pointed out,
“the genetic coding sequence that is the subject of each of the BRCA gene
claims remains the same whether the gene is in the body or isolated.”435 As
a result, removing the introns is arguably irrelevant in determining whether
the cDNA has markedly different characteristics and function than native
DNA.

430

Id. at 1340 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1355–56 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
432
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198–99
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that “cDNA does not contain non-coding intronic
sequences because it is derived from mRNA in which the introns have been
removed. As a result, the production of proteins from cDNA does not require
RNA splicing, in contrast to the production of proteins from native DNA as
described above.”).
433
Cochrane v. Badische, 111 U.S. 293, 31 (1884). Madder is “a Eurasian herb
(Rubia tinctorum of the family Rubiaceae, the madder family) with whorled leaves
and small yellowish panicled flowers succeeded by dark berries;” however it can
refer broadly to “any of several related herbs (genus Rubia).” Madder, MERRIAMWEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
madder (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). The “root of the Eurasian madder [was] used
formerly in dyeing . . . [and] an alizarin dye [was] prepared from it.” Id.
434
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129, 131 (1948).
435
Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1351 (Bryson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
431
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On the other hand, assume for the sake of argument that under
Chakrabartry there are enough differences in the characteristics and
functioning of the cDNA for claim 2 to constitute patentable subject matter.
The next section argues that under Prometheus, claim 2 would still
constitute unpatentable subject matter because claim 2 focuses on the
genetic code without any inventive concept added to the genetic code.
4. Nothing inventive added to the law of nature
Although claim 2 arguably adds something beyond the law of
nature—the actual sequence of the DNA—there is nothing inventive about
that addition. As Judge Bryson stated, “Myriad was not the first to map a
BRCA gene to its chromosomal location.”436 Judge Bryson further observed
“Myriad did not invent a new method of nucleotide sequencing. Instead, it
applied known sequencing techniques to identify the nucleotide order of the
BRCA genes.”437 Under Prometheus, that step of identifying the nucleotide
sequence is “not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations
into patentable applications.”438
Claim 2 in fact sets forth the natural correlation between
nucleotides and amino acids more clearly than claim 1.439 Claim 2 identifies
only the nucleotides—the exons—that code for the amino acids referred to
in claim 1. Neither Myriad Genetics nor any human created such
relationship inherent in nature—the genetic code. Neither Myriad nor any
human added anything inventive to the genetic code claimed to warrant
holding claim 2 patentable subject matter. Indeed, Myriad Genetics simply
removed excess material in claim 1 that did not participate in creating the
amino acids. Under Prometheus, the Federal Circuit should have held claim
2 did not constitute patentable subject matter.

436

Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1349. In discussing the isolation of the DNA, Judge Bryson added, “The
cleaving of covalent bonds incident to isolation is itself not inventive, and the fact
that the cleaved molecules have terminal groups that differ from the naturally
occurring nucleotide sequences does nothing to add any inventive character to the
claimed molecules.” Id. at 1355. See also Demain & Fellmeth, supra note 82 at 400
(“If a naturally occurring DNA molecule has the useful function of coding for
Protein X, then no purified or otherwise altered version of that DNA molecule can
be ‘new’ unless its claimed function is fundamentally different than coding for
Protein X.”).
438
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298
(2012).
439
E.g., U.S. Patent ’282, supra note 306, at fig.10A-H. As Patent ’282 details,
“[i]ndefinite intervals within introns are designated with vvvvvvvvvvvv,” which
shows that the ’282 patent did not identify all of the introns.
437
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CONCLUSION
Supreme Court precedents do not become irrelevant simply because
they are old, yet Judge Lourie’s and Judge Moore’s 2012 opinions in
Myriad Genetics would suggest otherwise. The deference shown by Judges
Lourie and Moore to the USPTO finds no support in Supreme Court
cases.440 The isolated DNA segments of claim 1 reflect human genes that
actually exist in nature, with neither substantial variation in characteristics
nor variation in function. The holdings in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers
require the reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision on claim 1.
Finally, the narrow interpretation by Judges Lourie, Moore, and
Bryson of Prometheus threatens to eviscerate the public domain in a vital
area of scientific research. The DNA of claim 1 reflects a physical
phenomenon (the sequence of nucleotides) and a law of nature (the
correlation between the exons and the amino acids expressed by those exons
constituting the genetic code). The cDNA of claim 2 also reflects that
genetic code. If the genetic code is not a law of nature, nothing is a law of
nature.
Myriad Genetics added nothing inventive to that law of nature to
warrant the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that claim 1 and claim 2
constituted patentable subject matter. Prometheus calls for a reversal of the
Federal Circuit’s decision on both claim 1 and claim 2.

440

See supra Part III.B.5. To the extent there are underlying factual disputes,
there is no basis set forth in the Federal Circuit’s three decisions for reversing
the findings of fact of the District Court. See generally Assoc. for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

